Cryptographic protocol logic: Satisfaction for (timed) Dolev–Yao cryptography  by Kramer, Simon
The Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 77 (2008) 60–91
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
The Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/ locate / j lap
Cryptographic protocol logic: Satisfaction for (timed) Dolev–Yao
cryptography
Simon Kramer
Ecole Polytechnique, Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Switzerland
A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T
Available online 2 July 2008
Keywords:
Applied formal logic
Cryptographic protocols
Requirements engineering
Modal logic
Process algebra
This article is about a breadth-ﬁrst exploration of logical concepts in cryptography and
their linguistic abstraction and model-theoretic combination in a comprehensive logical
system, called CPL (for Cryptographic Protocol Logic). We focus on two fundamental aspects
of cryptography. Namely, the security of communication (as opposed to security of storage)
and cryptographic protocols (as opposed to cryptographic operators). The logical concepts
explored are the following. Primary concepts: The modal concepts of knowledge, norms,
provability, space, and time. Secondary concepts: Individual and propositional knowl-
edge, conﬁdentiality norms, truth-functional and relevant (in particular, intuitionistic)
implication, multiple and complex truth values, and program types. The distinguishing
feature of CPL is that it uniﬁes and reﬁnes a variety of existing approaches. This feature is
the result of our wholistic conception of property-based (modal logics) and model-based
(process algebra) formalisms. We illustrate the expressiveness of CPL on representative
requirements engineering case studies. Further, we extend (core) CPL (qualitative time) with
rational-valued time, i.e. time stamps, timed keys, and potentially drifting local clocks, to
tCPL (quantitative time). Our extension is conservative and provides further evidence for
Lamport’s claim that adding real time to an untimed formalism is really simple.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
We give a comprehensive motivation for our approach to the correctness of cryptographic protocols by placing the
approach in its historical and topical context. The length of the introduction reﬂects our desire to expose a wide and deep
perspective on the highly interdisciplinary ﬁeld of cryptographic protocols.
1.1. Historical context
“A cryptographic protocol [. . .] is a distributed algorithm deﬁned by a sequence of steps precisely specifying the actions
required of two or more entities to achieve a speciﬁc security objective.” [82, P. 33]. Principal security objectives are secrecy
of conﬁdential information, authenticity of receivedmessagesw.r.t. their origin, and non-repudiation ofmessage authorship.
Our slogan is:
Slogan 1. The purpose of a cryptographic protocol is to interactively compute, via message passing,1 knowledge of the truth
of desired – and, dually, knowledge of the falsehood of undesired – cryptographic states of affairs.
E-mail address: simon.kramer@a3.epﬂ.ch
1 Rather than shared memory.
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In 1996, Anderson and Needham assert that cryptographic protocols typically “involve the exchange of about 2–5 mes-
sages, and one might think that a program of this size would be fairly easy to get right. However, this is absolutely not the
case: bugs are routinely found inwell knownprotocols, and years after theywere ﬁrst published. The problem is the presence
of a hostile opponent, who can altermessages at will. In effect, our task is to program a computer which gives answers which
are subtly andmaliciously wrong at themost inconvenient possible moment.” [8]. Indeed, designing a correct cryptographic
protocol (i.e., “programming Satan’s computer” [8]), is extremely more difﬁcult than designing a correct, ordinary computer
program (i.e., “programming Murphy’s [computer]” [8]) of the same size. In fact, at the end of the 1980s, i.e., 20 years after
the surge of the software crisis in the software-engineering community, the communication-security community was also
shaken by a software crisis, though a different one. The ﬁrst software crisis was provoked by the (increasing) size of computer
programs [42], whereas the second crisis was triggered by the (sudden, e.g., [16]) awareness about the complexity of the
structure of a certain class of suchprograms, namely cryptographic protocols. Our slogan, especially applying to cryptographic
protocols, is:
Slogan 2. In theory, it is possible to construct a correct computer programwithout knowing a theory of programcorrectness;
in practice, it rarely is.
The answer to both software crises has really been the formal-methodsmovement. In 1999, McLean afﬁrms that “[o]ne of
the biggest success stories of formalmethods in the computer security community is the application of them to cryptographic
protocols. Cryptographic protocols are small enough to be susceptible to complete formal analysis, and such analyses have
turned up ﬂaws that would have, otherwise, gone undetected.” [76]. However, McLean also points out “the need for more
research in the speciﬁcation arena.” in the same paper. In 2003, Meadows reafﬁrms and strengthens the importance of that
issue by observing that “[. . .] although it is difﬁcult to get cryptographic protocols right, what is really difﬁcult is not the
design of the protocol itself, but of the requirements. Many problems with security protocols arise, not because the protocol
as designed did not satisfy its requirements, but because the requirements were not well understood in the ﬁrst place.” [78]
(consider also, more generally, [86]). Our slogan is:
Slogan 3. Cryptographic protocol correctness: a killer application for formal methods.
1.2. Topical context
1.2.1. Requirements engineering – ideally
Indeed, the construction of a cryptographic protocol begins (and “ends” if this stage is not mastered) with requirements
engineering, i.e., the deﬁnition of the requirements (global properties) the protocol is supposed to meet. In particular, un-
derstanding protocol requirements is necessary for understanding protocol attacks, which can be looked at as falsiﬁcations
of necessary conditions for the requirements to hold. Protocol speciﬁcation (requirements engineering), design (modelling),
veriﬁcation, and implementation (programming) are engineering tasks (the spirit of [82]). In contrast, the construction of
a cryptographic operator (for encryption, signing, and hashing) is a scientiﬁc task (the spirit of [57,58]) requiring profound
expertise from different ﬁelds of discretemathematics.2 Protocol engineers do (and should) not have (to have) this expertise.
For example, it is legitimate for a protocol engineer to “abstract” negligible probabilities and consider them as what they
are – negligible. Ideally, engineers should only have to master a single, common, and formal language for requirements
engineering that adequately abstracts “hard-core” mathematical concepts.
Since logic is what all sciences have in common, it is natural to stipulate that such a lingua franca for requirements-
engineering cryptographic protocols be an appropriate logical language.
1.2.1.1. Program statement. We argue that a good candidate language is a candidate that is technically adequate and socially
acceptable. By a technically adequate candidate we mean a candidate that (1) is semantically and pragmatically sufﬁciently
expressive, i.e., versatile and yielding intuitive speciﬁcations, respectively; (2) has a cryptographically intuitive semantics; (3) is
completely axiomatisable; and (4) has important decidable fragments (e.g., the temporal fragment). By a versatile candidatewe
mean a candidate that allows all desirable speciﬁcations to be directly expressed, or else deﬁned, in terms of the primitives
of the candidate. By intuitive speciﬁcations we mean that the conceptual dimensions of a speciﬁcation are apparent in
distinctive forms in the formula that expresses the speciﬁcation – succinctly. By a socially acceptable candidate we mean a
candidate that uniﬁes and possibly transcends previous speciﬁcation languages.
Our task shall be to synthesise the relevant logical concepts in cryptography into a cryptographic protocol logic with a
temporal-logic skeleton. Our preference of temporal logic over program logics such as Hoare and dynamic logic is motivated
by the success of temporal logic as a speciﬁcation language for (non-cryptographic) interactive systems. We will validate
our language, at least at a ﬁrst stage, on speciﬁcation (stress on different requirements) rather than veriﬁcation (stress on
different protocols) case studies, since program speciﬁcationmust in theory, and should in practice – where it unfortunately
2 Consider also [85]: “The design of protocols and the design of operators are rather independent [. . .]. The protocol designer creates protocols assuming
the existence of operators with certain security properties. The operator designer proposes implementations of those operators, and tries to prove that the
proposed operators have the desired properties”.
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rarely does – precede program veriﬁcation. Nonetheless, the existence of veriﬁcation examples is guaranteed by subsumption
under CPL of other logics from authors with the opposite focus.
1.2.2. Requirements engineering – really
We brieﬂy survey requirements engineering (the practice of the speciﬁcation) of cryptographic protocols. Protocol de-
signers commonly deﬁne a cryptographic protocol jointly by a semi-formal description of its behaviour (or local properties)
in terms of protocol narrations, and by an informal prescription of its requirements (or global properties) in natural language
[25]. Informal speciﬁcations present two major drawbacks: they do not have a well-deﬁned, and thus a well-understood
meaning, and, therefore, they do not allow for veriﬁcation of correctness. In formal speciﬁcations of cryptographic protocols,
local and global properties are expressed either explicitly as such in a logical (or property-based) language, or implicitly as
code, resp. as encodings in a programming (ormodel-based) language (e.g., applied λ-Calculus [90]; process calculi: CSP [87],
applied π-Calculus [5], Spi-Calculus [6], and [81]).
1.2.2.1. Model-based languages. Themost popular examples of such encodings are equations between protocol instantiations
[2]. However, such encodings present four major drawbacks: (1) they have to be found for each protocol anew; worse, (2)
theymay not even exist; (3) they are neither directly comparable with other encodings in the same or in other programming
languages, nor with properties expressed explicitly in logical languages; and (4) they are not easy to understand because the
intuition of the encodedproperty is not explicit in the encoding; yet “[r]obust security is about explicitness.” [8]! On the other
hand, process calculi are ideal design formalisms. That is, they offer – due to their minimalist, linguistic abstractions of mod-
elling concepts (syntax) and their mathematical, operational notion of execution (semantics) – awin–win situation between
the (pedantic) rigour of (Turing) machine models and the (practical) usability of mainstream programming languages.
1.2.2.2. Property-based languages. Still, informal language and programming (or effect) languages are inadequate for express-
ingandcomparingcryptographicproperties. It is ourbelief thatonlya logical (or truth) languageequippedwithanappropriate
notion of truth, i.e., a cryptographic logic, will produce the necessary adequacy. A number of logics have been proposed in
this aim so far, ranging from special-purpose, cryptographic logics: the pioneering BAN-logic [16], a uniﬁcation of several
variants of BAN-logic [92], and a recent reworking of BAN-logic [70]; over general-purpose propositional, modal, program,
and ﬁrst- and higher-order logics used for the special purpose of cryptographic protocol analysis: propositional (“logic
programming”) [7,1]; modal: deontic [17], doxastic [3,97], epistemic [91,62], linear [18], temporal [54]; program: dynamic
[47,4], Hoare-style [43,72]; ﬁrst-order [34,89,36]; higher-order [84,65]; to combinations thereof: doxastic-epistemic [37],
doxastic-temporal [22], distributed temporal [38], dynamic-epistemic [15], epistemic-temporal [41,75] ﬁrst-order-temporal
[53], dynamic-epistemic-temporal [23], and deontic-epistemic-temporal [56].
All these logics have elucidated important concerns of the security of communication and proved the relevance of logical
concepts to that security. In particular, mere enunciation of maybe the three most fundamental protocol requirements,
namely secrecy, authenticity, and non-repudiation, reveals the paramount importance of the concept of knowledge, both
in its propositional (so-called knowledge de dicto) and in its individual (so-called knowledge de re) manifestation. Possible3
enunciations in natural language of these requirements are the following (cf. Section 3 for their formalisation in CPL). Secrecy
for a protocol: “Always and for all messages m, if it is forbidden that the adversary (Eve) know m then Eve does not know
m.” (knowledge de re in the present subjunctive and the present indicative mode, respectively). Authenticity of a message
m from the viewpoint of agent a w.r.t. agent b: “a knows that once only b knew m.” (knowledge de dicto in the present and
knowledge de re in the past indicative mode). Non-repudiation of authorship of a messagem′ by bw.r.t. a, corroborated by a
proofm (m is a proof for a that b is the author ofm′): “If a knewm then awould know that once only b knewm′.” (knowledge de
re in the past subjunctive and then in the past indicative mode, and knowledge de dicto in the conditional mode). However,
general-purpose/standard epistemic logic is inadequate in a cryptographic setting due to weak paradoxes, as is, for the same
reason, (standard) deontic logic (cf. Section 2.3). (We recall that a weak paradox in a logic is a counter-intuitive statement
in the logic, whereas a strong paradox is an inconsistency in the logic.) And doxastic logic is inadequate because the above
requirements are ineffable in it, as these crucially rely on knowledge, i.e., necessarily true, and not possibly false, belief (no
error control!). Our slogan, and pun,4 is:
Slogan 4. Belief (without error control) can be used to show the presence of attacks, but, as opposed to knowledge, never
to show their absence.5
Further, linear logic has, for our approach, aﬂavour that is toooperational to the extent that it is possible that “the combinators
of a process calculus are mapped to [linear] logical connectives” [79]. Our approach is diametric, i.e., we aim at providing
declarative abstractions (thewhat) of operational aspects (the how). Finally, special-purpose logics have been limited in their
adequacy due to their choice of primitive concepts, e.g., belief, no negation/quantiﬁcation, too speciﬁc primitive concepts at
the price of high extension costs.
3 As a matter of fact unique, canonical formulations of these requirements do not exist (yet).
4 On the slogan “Program testing can be used to show the presence of bugs, but never to show their absence!” by Dijkstra.
5 This is the deeper reason for the well-known limitations of BAN-logic.
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Logical limitations originate in design decisions of syntactic (language-deﬁning operators) and/or semantic (meaning-
deﬁning notion of truth) nature. The advantages (or disadvantages) of the cited logics are corollaries of the respective
advantages (or disadvantages) of capturing (or not) the discussed and to-be-discussed concepts. In particular, crucial ad-
vantages are to capture: (1) individual and propositional knowledge, with a treatment of weak paradoxes; (2) permission
and prohibition, with a treatment of weak paradoxes; (3) proof and provability; (4) protocol composition (either with
dynamic/Hoare-logic constructs, or with spatial-logic constructs as in CPL); and (5) time (both qualitative and quantitative).
1.2.3. Requirements engineering – CPL
Ourgoal is to supply a formal synthesisof (mono-dimensional) concepts in a single, poly-dimensional6 modal logic, namely
CPL,7 that yields requirements that are intuitive but (syntactically) abstract w.r.t. particular conceptions of cryptography.8
First, our belief, expressed as a slogan, is:
Slogan 5. The formal method for any science is, ultimately, logic.
Logic, as deﬁned by a relation of satisfaction (model-theoretic approach,9 effectuated via model-checking [33]) or a relation
of deduction (proof -theoretic approach, effectuated via automated theorem-proving [49]). Second, given that requirements
engineering is mainly about meaning, i.e., understanding and formalising properties, we believe that a model-theoretic ap-
proach is, at least at a ﬁrst stage,more suitable than a proof-theoretic approach.We argue that propositional and higher-order
(at least beyond second order) logic, and set theory are unsuitable as front-end formalisms for requirements engineering.
Propositional logic is simply too weak as a speciﬁcation language but is well-suited for fully-automated, approximative
veriﬁcation. Higher-order logic and set theorymaywell be semantically sufﬁciently expressive; however, we opine that they
are unsuitable for engineers in charge of capturing meaning of protocol requirements within an acceptable amount of time
(i.e., ﬁnancial cost per speciﬁcation) and space (i.e., intelligibility of speciﬁcations). The intuitiveness of the speciﬁcations
that a formalism yields is not just luxury, but the very (and difﬁcult to distil) essence and a measure of its pragmatics, i.e.,
practical usefulness. Our slogan10 is:
Slogan 6. Logic for engineering necessarily is, possibly ﬁrst-order, modal logic.
Modal operators (modalities) are object-level abstractions of meta-level quantiﬁers. In effect, they eliminate variables (and
the quantiﬁers that bind them) in logical (truth) languages as combinators do in programming (effect) languages, and
delimit quantiﬁcation to the relevant (i.e., accessible) parts of the interpretation structure. Their beneﬁts are intelligibility
of the expressed statement, and effectiveness and relative efﬁciency of truth establishment, respectively. The concept of a
cryptographic protocol is very rich. A suitable formalismmust organise and hard-wire/pre-compile this conceptual variety in
its semantics and provide succinct and intuitive linguistic abstractions (syntax) for them. The resulting added value of such
a formalism is empowerment of the engineer (speed-up of the mental process of requirements formalisation),11 and more
powerful tools (speed-up of model-checking and automated theorem-proving). Higher-order logic and set theory, having
been conceived as general-purpose formalisms, obviously lack this special-purpose semantics and syntax. However, they are
well-suited as logical frameworks (meta-logics/back-ends) for such special-purpose formalisms (object logics/front-ends).
For example, our candidate language has a model-theoretic (i.e., relying on set theory) semantics.
CPL has a ﬁrst-order fragment for making statements about protocol events and about the (individual) knowledge
(“knows”) and the structure of cryptographic messages induced by those events; and four modal fragments for making
statements about conﬁdentiality norms (cf. deontic logic [17]); propositional knowledge (“knows that”), i.e., knowledge of
cryptographic states of affairs, (cf. epistemic logic [48]); execution space (cf. spatial logic [39]); and execution time (cf.
temporal logic [80]). That is, CPL uniﬁes ﬁrst-order and four modal logics in a single, ﬁrst-order, poly-dimensional modal
logic. Further, CPL reﬁnes standard epistemic and deontic logic in the sense that it resolves the long-standing problem of
weak paradoxes (caused by logical omniscience and conﬂicting obligations, respectively) that these logics exhibit when
applied in a cryptographic setting (cf. Section 2.3). Yet CPL (a property-based formalism) goes even further in its wholistic
ambition in that it integrates the perhapsmost importantmodel-based framework, namely process algebra [27], in a novel co-
design. First, CPL’s temporal accessibility relation (the semantics of its temporal modalities) can be deﬁned by an event-trace
generating process (reduction) calculus, for example C3 [24,21,69] whose reduction constraints canmoreover be checked via
CPL-satisfaction; and second,12 CPL’s epistemic accessibility relation (the semantics of its epistemic modality “knows that”)
is the deﬁnitional basis for C3’s observational equivalence, which can be used for the model-based (process-algebraic and
6 cf. [51] for a research monograph on poly-dimensional modal logic, characterised in [19] as “ . . . a branch of modal logic dealing with special relational
structures in which the states, rather than being abstract entities, have some inner structure. . . . Furthermore, the accessibility relations between these
states are (partly) determined by this inner structure of the states”.
7 A preliminary, now outdated version of CPL appeared in the informal proceedings of [68].
8 Such logics are called endogenous (or mono-modal), as opposed to exogenous (or poly-modal).
9 Not to be confused with a model-based formalism.
10 And pun on the two cornerstones of modal logic, namely possibility and necessity.
11 In analogy with high-level programming languages versus machine-code languages.
12 This idea seems to have been published ﬁrst in [64]. However, the authors adopt a very different approach based on so-called function views.
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Table 1
Message language
M ::= n (names, i.e., logical constants)∣∣  (the abstract message)∣∣ p+ (public keys)∣∣ ⌈M⌉ (message hashes)∣∣ {∣∣M∣∣}
M
(symmetric message ciphers)∣∣ {∣∣M∣∣}+
p+ (asymmmetric message ciphers)∣∣ {∣∣M∣∣}−
p
(signed messages)∣∣ (M,M) (message tuples)
complementary to property-based) formulation of protocol requirements. We believe that this co-design is also the key to a
genuine modal model theory for cryptography.
1.2.3.1. Justiﬁcation. A cryptographic protocol involves the concurrent interaction of agents that are physically separated by
– and exchange messages across – an unreliable and insecure transmission medium. Expressing properties of concurrent
interaction (i.e., interactive computation) requires temporal modalities [80]. The physical separation by an unreliable and
insecure transmission medium (i.e., unreliable computation) in turn demands the epistemic and deontic modalities. To
see why, consider that the existence of such a separating medium introduces an uncertainty among agents about the
trustworthiness of the execution of protocol actions (sending, receiving) and the contents of exchanged messages, both
w.r.t. actuality (an epistemic concern) and legitimacy (a deontic concern).
Slogan 7. Trustworthiness = Actuality + Legitimacy
The purpose of a cryptographic protocol is to reëstablish this trustworthiness through the judicious use of cryptographic
evidence, i.e., essential information (e.g., ciphers, signatures and hash values) for the knowledge of other information (e.g.,
messages or truth of formulae), bred in a crypto system (e.g., a shared-key or public-key system) from cryptographic germs such
as keys and nonces, themselves generated from cryptographic seeds (or seed values). However, any use of keys (as opposed
to hash values and nonces) requires that the knowledge of those keys be shared a priori. This sharing of key knowledge
is established by cryptographic protocols called key-establishment protocols (comprising key-transport and key-agreement
protocols) [82, Chapter 12], which are executed before any cryptographic protocol that may then subsequently use those
keys. Thus certain cryptographic protocolsmust be considered interrelated by a notion of composition in a commonexecution
space; hence the need of spatial operators. Another argument for spatial operators comes from the fact that a correct protocol
should conserve its sole correctness evenwhen composedwith other protocols, i.e., a compositionally correct protocol should
be stable in different execution contexts [30,28].
2. Logic
2.1. Syntax
The languageF ofCPL isparametric in the languageMof its individuals, i.e., cryptographicmessages. It is chieﬂy relational,
and functional in exactly the languageM of cryptographic messages it may be instantiated with. The temporal fragment of
F coincides with the syntax of LTLP (linear temporal logic with past). We shall ﬁx our mind on the following, comprehensive
languageM.
Deﬁnition 1 (Cryptographic messages). We form messages M ∈ M with the term constructors displayed in Table 1. There,
names n ∈ N denote agent names a,b,c ∈ A, the (for the moment Dolev–Yao [44]) adversary’s name Eve, symmetric short-
term (session) (K1) and long-term (K∞) keys k ∈ K, (asymmetric) private keys p ∈ K−, and nonces x ∈ X (also used as
session identiﬁers).
Weassume that given aprivate key p, one can compute the correspondingpublic key p+, as inDSAandElgamal. Shared and
private keys shall be referred to as conﬁdential keys CK, i.e., keys that must remain secret. Symmetric keys may be compound
for key agreement (as opposed to mere key transport). Message forms (open messages) F are messages with variables v ∈ V .
Weuse the termsprivacy, conﬁdentiality, and secrecy toqualify cryptographic informationw.r.t. the legitimacy, the intention,
resp. theactualityof theknowledgeof that information (statusofdiscreetness). For example, inasymmetric-keycryptography,
the knowledge of a key for decrypting or signing cryptographic information is limited to the discretion of a single entity,
say a. Thus, such a key qualiﬁes as the private key of entity a; and to-be-encrypted plaintext is by deﬁnition cryptographic
information whose knowledge is intended to be limited to the discretion of the sender and the recipient(s), i.e., it is qualiﬁed
conﬁdential a priori, and may be qualiﬁed secret by vigour of veriﬁcation a posteriori.
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Table 2
Predicate language
φ,φ′ ::= β ∣∣ ¬φ ∣∣ φ ∧ φ′ ∣∣ ∀v(φ)∣∣ Pφ︸︷︷︸
norms
∣∣ Ka(φ) ∣∣ φ ⊇ φ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
knowledge
∣∣ φ ⊗ φ′ ∣∣ φφ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
space
∣∣ φ S φ′ ∣∣©−φ ∣∣©+φ ∣∣ φ U φ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
time
β,β ′ ::= α ∣∣ δ
α,α′ ::= an.o ∣∣ a F−→Eve b ∣∣ a F←−Eve b︸ ︷︷ ︸
private comm.
∣∣ a F−→
Eve
b
∣∣ a ←
Eve
F︸ ︷︷ ︸
public comm.
δ,δ′ ::= n : σ ∣∣ a k F ∣∣ F F ′ ∣∣ a@x
The abstract message is a computational artiﬁce to represent the absence of intelligibility, just as the number zero is a
computational artiﬁce to represent the absence of quantity. The abstract message is very useful for doing knowledge-based
calculations (cf. Deﬁnition 5), just as the number zero is very useful (to say the least) for doing number-based calculations.
The focus on cryptographic protocols rather than cryptographic operators leads us (for the moment) to (1) making
abstraction from the exact representation of messages, e.g., bit strings; and assuming (2.1) perfect hashing, i.e., collision
resistance (hash functions are injective) and strong pre-image resistance (hash functions are not invertible, or given
⌈
M
⌉
, it
is infeasible to compute M), and (2.2) perfect encryption (given
{∣∣M∣∣}
k
but not the shared key k or given
{∣∣M∣∣}+
p+ but not the
private key p corresponding to the public key p+, it is infeasible to computeM).
We introduce a type language for messages to increase the succinctness of statements about the structure of messages.
Deﬁnition 2 (Message types). Message types τ have the following structure.
τ ,τ ′ ::= ∅ ∣∣ σ ∣∣M∣∣ H[τ ] ∣∣ SCM [τ ] ∣∣ ACp+ [τ ] ∣∣ Sp[τ ] ∣∣ T[τ ,τ ′] ∣∣ τ ∪ τ ′ ∣∣ τ ∩ τ ′ ∣∣ τ \ τ ′
σ ,σ ′ ::= A ∣∣ Adv ∣∣ ς ∣∣ K+
ς ,ς ′ ::= K1 ∣∣ K∞ ∣∣ K− ∣∣ X
Message type forms θ shall be message types with variables in key position.
Observe that (1) for each kind ofmessage there is a corresponding type (e.g., H[τ ] for hashes, SCM[τ ] for symmetric and ACp+ [τ ]
for asymmetric ciphers, Sp[τ ] for signatures, and T[τ ,τ ′] for tuples); (2) encryption and signature types are parametric; and (3)
the union, intersection, and difference of two message types is again a message type. In short, message types are structure-
describing dependent types closed under union, intersection, and difference. ς and ς ′ denote types of dynamically generable
names. We macro-deﬁne AAdv := A ∪ Adv, K := K1 ∪ K∞, CK := K ∪ K−, K* := CK ∪ K+, and N := AAdv ∪ K* ∪ X.
Deﬁnition 3 (Logical formulae). The set of formulae F contains precisely those propositions that are the closed predicates
formed with the sentence constructors displayed in Table 2. There, β denotes basic, α action, and δ data formulae; and o
denotes tuples of agent names (key owners).
Predicates can be transformed into propositions either via binding of free variables, i.e., universal (generalisation) or
existential (abstraction) quantiﬁcation, or via substitution of individuals for free variables (individuation). In accordance with
standard logical methodology, basic predicates express elementary facts.13
Our symbols are – and their intuitivemeaning is as they are – pronounced¬ “not”,∧ “and”, ∀v “for all v”, P “it is permitted
that”, Ka “a knows that”, ⊇ “epistemically implies”, ⊗ “conjunctively separates”,  “assume – guarantee”, S “since”, ©−
“previous”, ©+ “next”, U “until”, an.o “a freshly generated the name n for owner(s) o”, a F−→Eve b “a securely (i.e., over some
private channel) sent F as such (i.e., not only as a strict sub-term of another message) to b”, a
F←−Eve b “a securely received F as
such from b”, a
F−→
Eve
b “a insecurely (i.e., over some public channel) sent off F as such to b”, a ←
Eve
F “a insecurely received F as
such”, : “has type”, k “knows”,  “is a subterm of”, and @ “is in protocol run/session”.
13 A fact is a contingent (particular) truth as opposed to a logical (universal) truth.
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Our predicate language is 1-sorted thanks to the standard technique of sort reduction14 and to the fact that agents are
referred to by their name and names are transmittable data, i.e., messages.
The modality K expresses propositional knowledge, i.e., the knowledge that a certain proposition is true. In contrast,
the relational symbol k expresses individual knowledge. Individual knowledge conveys understanding of the purpose and
possession of a certain piece of cryptographic information up to cryptographically irreducible parts. It is established based
on the capability of agents to synthesise those pieces from previously analysed pieces. By ‘understanding of the purpose’ we
mean (1) knowledge of the structure for compound, and (2) knowledge of the identity for atomic (names) information. Note
that such understanding requires that there be aminimal redundancy in that information. The conditional φ ⊇ φ′ is epistemic
in the sense that the set of evidence corroborating truth of the consequent φ′ (e.g., the knowledge of a key) is included in
the set of evidence corroborating truth of the antecedent φ (e.g., the knowledge of a plaintext derived from that key). The
epistemic conditional captures the epistemic dependence of the truth of the antecedent on the truth of the consequent.
The formula φ ⊗ φ′ is satisﬁed by a (protocol) model if and only if the model can be separated in exactly two parts such
that one part satisﬁes φ (e.g., key establishment/production) and the other satisﬁes φ′ (e.g., key use/consumption). The spatial
conditional φφ′ is satisﬁed by a model if and only if for all models that satisfy φ the adjunction of the second to the ﬁrst
model satisﬁes φ′ (cf. compositional correctness of a protocol, as mentioned earlier).
Typing formulaeF : θ haveanessential andapragmaticpurpose. Typingof atomicdata, i.e.,whenF designatesanamenand
θ an atomic type σ , is a linguistic abstraction for the above-mentionedessentialmodellinghypothesis ofminimal redundancy.
Typing of compound data simply increases succinctness of statements aboutmessage structure. It is actuallymacro-deﬁnable
in terms of typing of atomic data, equality (itself macro-deﬁnable), and existential quantiﬁcation (cf. Appendix A).
2.2. Semantics
Our deﬁnition of satisfaction is anchored (or rooted) and deﬁned on protocol states, i.e., tuples (h,P) ∈ H× P of a protocol
model P (i.e., a process term of parallel-composable, located threads a.x [T]) and a protocol history h (i.e., a trace of past
protocol events). Note that history-dependency is characteristic of interactive computation [60].
The logically-inclined reader will notice that CPL has a Herbrand-semantics, i.e., logical constants and functional symbols
are self-interpreted rather than interpreted in terms of (other, semantic) constants and functions.
Slogan 8 (Symbolic foundationalism). Meaning, when communicable, is symbolic. Semantics is interpretation of syntax via
rewriting.
For the present purpose, we presuppose a notion of execution, for example [24,69],−→⊆ (H× P)2 (or relation of temporal
accessibility in the jargon of modal logic) producing protocol events of a certain kind and chaining them up to form protocol
histories. We stress that the locality and parallel-composability of processes (denoted P|||P′), and the kind of protocol events
are the only particularities of −→ that we presuppose.
Protocol events are of the following kind: generation of a name n for owners o (recall that o is a tuple of agent names) in
session x by a, written N(a,x,n,o); insecure input ofM by a, written I(a,x,M); secure input ofM from b by a, written sI(a,x,M,b);
insecure output of M to b by a, written O(a,x,M,b); and secure output of M to b by a, written sO(a,x,M,b). By deﬁnition, an
event ε is secure if and only if ε is unobservable by the adversary Eve. By convention, name generation is a secure event.
We write ε(a) for any of the above protocol events, ε(a,n) for any of the above name-generation events, ε(a,M) for any of the
above communication events, and εˆ(a) for any of the above secure events. Protocol histories h ∈ H are simply ﬁnite words of
protocol events ε, i.e., event traces h ::=  ∣∣ h · ε, where  designates the empty protocol history.
We deﬁne satisfaction in a functional style (with a function of truth denotation) on the structure of formulae. Satisfaction
employs complex (and thus multiple) truth values. Truth values are complex in the sense that they are tuples of a simple
truth value (i.e., ‘true’ or ‘false’) and a set of those events (the evidence/witnesses) that corroborate that simple truth.
Note that the deﬁnition employs macro-deﬁned predicates (cf. Appendix A; the reader is urged to consult it).
Deﬁnition 4 (Satisfaction). Let |= ⊆ (H× P) × F designate satisfaction of a formula φ ∈ F by a protocol state s ∈ H× P (the
anchor/root of an implicit execution path model15 for φ):
s |= φ :iff there is a set E of protocol events s.t. s |=E φ
s |=E φ :iff for all p ∈ paths(s), [[φ]]0p = (true,E)
where paths(s) := { p | p@0 = s and for all i < |p|, p@0 −→* p@i } designates the set of paths p achored/rooted in s and
inducedby−→, and [[·]]designates our functionof truthdenotation from formulae to complex truth values (cf. Table 4). There,
• p@i designates the state, say – please memorise – (h,P), at position i in p
• h˙ designates the set of events derived from the trace of events h
14 Introduction of unary relational symbols (· : σ in our case) emulating the different sorts.
15 Notice the two notions of amodel: namely, the one of amodel for a logical formula (i.e., a protocol state (h,P)), and the one of amodel of a cryptographic
protocol (i.e., a process term P).
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Table 3
Derivation of individual knowledge
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Data extraction
h · ε(a,M) {ε(a,M)}a (a,M)
h Ea M
h · ε Ea M
Data synthesis Data analysis
h Ea M h E ′a M′
h E∪E ′a (M,M′)
h Ea (M,M′)
h Ea M
h Ea (M,M′)
h Ea M′
h Ea p
h Ea p+
h Ea M
h Ea
⌈
M
⌉
h Ea M h E ′a M′
h E∪E ′a
{∣∣M∣∣}
M′
h Ea
{∣∣M∣∣}
M′ h E
′
a M
′
h E∪E ′a M
h Ea M h E ′a p+
h E∪E ′a
{∣∣M∣∣}+
p+
h Ea
{∣∣M∣∣}+
p+ h E
′
a p
h E∪E ′a M
h Ea M h E ′a p
h E∪E ′a
{∣∣M∣∣}−
p
h Ea
{∣∣M∣∣}−
p
h E ′a p+
h E∪E ′a M
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
• h Ea M designates derivation of M by a from – this is a novel idea – the set E of events in a’s view on h, i.e., the
extraction, analysis, and synthesis of the data that a has generated, received, or sent in h (cf. Table 3)16
• ◦ designates concatenation of histories conserving uniqueness of events
•  := ∃(k : CK)(Eve k k ∧ ¬ k ck Eve) designates a state formula expressing the state of violation in a Dolev–Yao adver-
sarial setting, namely the one where the adversary has come to know a conﬁdential key not of her own
• ≈a ⊆ (H× P)2 designates the relation of epistemic accessibility associated with themodality Ka; it is deﬁned hereafter
• (|· |)ha designates a unary function (inspired by [10]) of cryptographic parsing deﬁned on protocol states and on logical
formulae; it is deﬁned hereafter on messages and tacitly lifted onto protocol states and logical formulae
• ≡ designates a relation of structural equivalence deﬁned on process terms and on event traces. On process terms, it
designates the smallest equivalence relation expressing associativity and commutativity of processes. On event traces,
it designates shufﬂing.
The permission modality is included in the logic because we want to highlight that each new notion of state of violation
will give rise to a new notion of permission, such as the one for real time (cf. Section 4.2) or the ones for probabilistic
polynomial-time settings [69, Chapter 5]. That is, we look at the state formula  as a parameter of the logic.
The epistemic accessibility relation has, as previously mentioned, a double use. It not only serves as the deﬁnitional basis
for the epistemic modality of CPL, but also as the deﬁnitional basis for the observational equivalence of C3 [24,21,69].
Notice that the spatial conditional ismonotonicw.r.t. positive antecedents, e.g., |= a k M  a k M, but |= ¬ a k M  ¬ a k
M due to the possibility for a of learning additional information from the adjunction.
Cryptographic parsing captures an agent’s capability to understand the structure of a cryptographically obfuscated
message. It allows the deﬁnition of a cryptographically meaningful notion of epistemic accessibility via the intermediate
concept of structurally indistinguishable protocol histories. The idea is to parse unintelligible messages to the abstract
message.
Deﬁnition 5 (Cryptographic parsing). The cryptographic parsing function (|· |)ha associated with an agent a ∈ P and a protocol
history h ∈ H (and complying with the assumptions of perfect cryptography) is an identity on names, the abstract message,
and public keys; and otherwise acts as deﬁned in Table 5.
16 We could easily account for individual knowledge modulo an equational theory of cryptographic messages, i.e., a set of algebraic properties of crypto-
graphic operators expressedwith an equivalence relation≡ ⊆ M×M, by adding a rule h 
E
a M
h Ea M′
M ≡ M′ . Further, agent-name guessing could bemodelled
by adding an axiom h Ea b
b ∈AEve .
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Table 4
Truth denotation
[[an.o]]ip := (E /= ∅,E) where E := ∪x∈X {N(a,x,n,o)} ∩ h˙
[[a M−→Eve b]]
i
p := (E /= ∅,E) where E := ∪x∈X {sO(a,x,M,b)} ∩ h˙
[[a M←−Eve b]]
i
p := (E /= ∅,E) where E := ∪x∈X {sI(a,x,M,b)} ∩ h˙
[[a M−→
Eve
b]]ip := (E /= ∅,E) where E := ∪x∈X {O(a,x,M,b)} ∩ h˙
[[a ←
Eve
M]]ip := (E /= ∅,E) where E := ∪x∈X {I(a,x,M)} ∩ h˙
[[n : σ ]]ip := (n has type σ ,∅)
[[a k M]]ip := (E /= ∅,E) where E :=
⋃
MinSets⊆ { E
′ | h E ′a M }
[[MM′]]ip := (M is a subterm ofM′,∅)
[[a@x]]ip := (there is a thread T s.t. P = a.x [T] and h = h|a.x ,∅)
[[¬φ]]ip := (not vφ ,Eφ) where [[φ]]ip = (vφ ,Eφ)
[[φ ∧ φ′]]ip := (vφ and vφ′ ,Eφ ∪ Eφ′ ) where
[[φ]]ip = (vφ ,Eφ) and
[[φ′]]ip = (vφ′ ,Eφ′ )
[[∀v(φ)]]ip := (for allM ∈ M, vM ,
⋃
M∈MEM) where [[
{M
/v
}
φ]]ip = (vM ,EM)
[[Pφ]]ip := [[(φ ∧ ¬ )  ( → ( ⊇ φ))]]ip
[[Ka(φ)]]ip := (for all s, if p@0 −→* s and s ≈a p@i then s′ |=E ′ φ′,E ′(s,φ))
where (s′,φ′) :=
{
(s,φ) if s = p@i, and
((|s |)ha , (|φ |)ha ) otherwise.
[[φ ⊇ φ′]]ip := (if vφ then vφ′ and ∅ /= Eφ′ ⊆ Eφ ,Eφ) where
[[φ]]ip = (vφ ,Eφ) and
[[φ′]]ip = (vφ′ ,Eφ′ )
[[φ ⊗ φ′]]ip := (there are Q ,Q ′ ∈ P and h′,h′′ ∈ H s.t. P ≡ Q |||Q ′ and h ≡ h′ ◦ h′′
and (h
′
,Q ) |=Eφ φ and (h′′,Q ′) |=Eφ′ φ′, Eφ ∪ Eφ′ )
[[φ  φ′]]ip := (for all (h,Q ) ∈ H×P and h′′ ≡ h ◦ h, if (h′,Q ) |=E ′ φ then
(h
′′
,Q ||| P) |=E ′′ φ′,
⋃E ′′ ∪⋃E ′)
[[φ S φ′]]ip := (there is k s.t. 0 ≤ k ≤ i and vk and for all j, if k < j ≤ i then vj ,⋃
j Ej ∪ Ek) where [[φ]]jp = (vj ,Ej) and [[φ′]]kp = (vk ,Ek)
[[©−φ]]ip :=
{
[[φ]]i−1p if i > 0, and
(false,∅) otherwise.
[[©+φ]]ip :=
{
[[φ]]i+1p if i < |p| − 1, and
(false,∅) otherwise.
[[φ U φ′]]ip := (there is k s.t. i ≤ k and vk and for all j, if i ≤ j < k then vj ,⋃
j Ej ∪ Ek) where [[φ]]jp = (vj ,Ej) and [[φ′]]kp = (vk ,Ek)
Aparticularity of this notion of cryptographic parsing is that ifh |= a k k andh′ |= a k k then (∣∣{∣∣M∣∣}
k
∣∣)h
a
= = (∣∣{∣∣M′∣∣}
k
∣∣)h′
a
.
That is, two different plaintexts (M and M′) encrypted under the same symmetric key (k) are parsed to the same (abstract)
message (), when the parsing agent does not know the decrypting key. This is justiﬁed by the fact that in reality, and in an
extension of CPLwith a notion of probabilistic (polynomial-time) computation (cf. [69, Chapter 5]), encryption is probabilistic
anyway, which has precisely the effect of rendering the above ciphers (computationally) indistinguishable to a parsing
agent.
Deﬁnition 6 (Structurally indistinguishable protocol histories). Two protocol histories h and h
′
are structurally indistinguishable
from the viewpoint of an agent a, written h ≈a h′, :iff a observes the same event pattern and the same data patterns in h and
h
′
. Formally, for all h,h
′ ∈ H, h ≈a h′ :iff h ≈(h,h
′
)
a h
′
where,
• given that a is a legitimate agent or the adversary Eve,
(1)
 ≈(h,h′)a 
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Table 5
Parsing cryptographic messages
(∣∣⌈M⌉ ∣∣)h
a
:=
⎧⎨
⎩
⌈(∣∣M ∣∣)h
a
⌉
if h |= a k M, and
 otherwise.
(∣∣{∣∣M∣∣}
M′
∣∣)h
a
:=
⎧⎨
⎩
{∣∣ (∣∣M ∣∣)h
a
∣∣}
(|M′ |)ha if h |= a k M
′, and
 otherwise.
(∣∣∣{∣∣M∣∣}+p+ ∣∣∣)ha :=
{{∣∣ (∣∣M ∣∣)h
a
∣∣}+
p+ if h |= a k p ∨ (a k M ∧ a k p+), and
 otherwise.
(∣∣∣{∣∣M∣∣}−p ∣∣∣)ha :=
{{∣∣ (∣∣M ∣∣)h
a
∣∣}−
p
if h |= a k p+, and
 otherwise.(∣∣(M,M′) ∣∣)h
a
:= ((∣∣M ∣∣)h
a
,
(∣∣M′ ∣∣)h
a
)
(2)
hl ≈(h,h
′
)
a hr
hl · ε(a,n) ≈(h,h
′
)
a hr · ε(a,n)
(3)
hl ≈(h,h
′
)
a hr
hl · ε(a,M) ≈(h,h
′
)
a hr · ε(a,M′)
(∣∣M ∣∣)h
a
= (∣∣M′ ∣∣)h′
a
• given that a is a legitimate agent,
(4)
hl ≈(h,h
′
)
a hr
hl · ε(b) ≈(h,h
′
)
a hr
a /= b hl ≈
(h,h′)
a hr
hl ≈(h,h
′
)
a hr · ε(b)
a /= b
• given that a is the adversary Eve,
(5)
hl ≈(h,h
′
)
Eve hr
hl · εˆ(b) ≈(h,h
′
)
Eve hr
Eve /= b hl ≈
(h,h′)
Eve hr
hl ≈(h,h
′
)
Eve hr · εˆ(b)
Eve /= b
(6)
hl ≈(h,h
′
)
Eve hr
hl · I(b,x,M) ≈(h,h
′
)
Eve hr · I(b,x,M′)
(∣∣M ∣∣)hEve = (∣∣M′ ∣∣)h′Eve
(7)
hl ≈(h,h
′
)
Eve hr
hl · O(b,x,M,c) ≈(h,h
′
)
Eve hr · O(b,x,M′,c)
(∣∣M ∣∣)hEve = (∣∣M′ ∣∣)h′Eve
Note that the observations at the different (past) stages hl and hr in h and h
′
, respectively, must be made with the whole
(present) knowledge of h and h
′
(cf. hl ≈(h,h
′
)· hr). Learning new keys may render intelligible past messages to an agent a in
the present that were not to her before.
Remark 1. For all a ∈ AEve, ≈a ⊆ H×H is
(1) an equivalence with an inﬁnite index due to fresh-name generation
(2) not a right-congruence due to the possibility of learning new keys
(3) a reﬁnement on the projectionH|a ofH onto a’s view [48]
(4) decidable.
We lift structural indistinguishability fromprotocol histories to protocol states, i.e., tuples of a protocol termand aprotocol
history, and ﬁnally obtain our relation of epistemic accessibility.
Deﬁnition 7 (Observationally equivalent protocol states). Let P1 and P2 designate two cryptographic processes, i.e., models of
cryptographic protocols, of some set P . Then two protocol states (h1,P1) and (h2,P2) are observationally equivalent from the
viewpoint of an agent a, written (h1,P1) ≈a (h2,P2), :iff h1 ≈a h2.
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Proposition 1. Let for all φ,φ′ ∈ F ,
• [[φ]] = [[φ′]] :iff for all p and i, [[φ]]ip = [[φ′]]ip
• |= φ, pronounced “φ is a logical truth (or tautology) in CPL”, :iff for all s ∈ H× P , s |= φ.
Then for all φ,φ′ ∈ F ,
(1) if |= φ ≡ φ′ then [[φ]] = [[φ′]]
(2) if [[φ]] = [[φ′]] then |= φ ↔ φ′.
Proof. Almost by deﬁnition. 
Deﬁnition 8 (Logical consequence and equivalence). Let φ,φ′ ∈ F .
Then,
• φ′ is a logical consequence of φ, written φ ⇒ φ′, :iff for all s ∈ P ×H, if s |= φ then s |= φ′.
• φ′ is logically equivalent to φ, written φ ⇔ φ′, :iff φ ⇒ φ′ and φ′ ⇒ φ.
Remark 2. φ ⊇ φ′ ⇒ φ → φ′ but φ → φ′ ⇒ φ ⊇ φ′.
Deﬁnition 9 (CPL: logic and logical theory).
• logic (a body of truth):
CPL := { φ | |= φ }
• logical theory (a system of inference):
CPL := { φ | there is s ∈ H× P s.t. s |= φ }
(For all φ ∈ CPL and φ′ ∈ F , if φ ⇒ φ′ then φ′ ∈ CPL.)
Theorem 1 (Barcan and relativised Co-Barcan).
Barcan |= ∀m(Ka(φ)) → Ka(∀m(φ))
Co-Barcan |= Ka(∀m(a k m → φ)) → ∀m(a k m → Ka(φ))
Proof. See Appendix B. 
The Barcan property w.r.t. propositional knowledge (Ka) is quite standard. However, the relativisation to individual knowledge
(k) to obtain the converse Barcan property is novel. (The plain converse Barcan property obviously does not hold in a
cryptographic context.)
Corollary 1. |= Ka(∀m(a k m → φ)) ↔ ∀m(a k m → Ka(φ)).
In words: propositional knowledge commutes with universal (and analogously with existential) quantiﬁcation when that
quantiﬁcation is relativised to (or: guarded by) individual knowledge.
Remark 3. CPL-satisfaction (“model-checking”) is undecidable, as secrecy, being CPL-deﬁnable (cf. Section 3.2), is.
2.3. Discussion
2.3.1. Expressiveness
The undecidability of the model-checking problem of CPL is intriguing because CPL is overtly ﬁrst-order and the model-
checking problem of plain ﬁrst-order logic is decidable, in fact PSPACE-complete17 [29]. The deeper reason for this intriguing
state of affairs is that CPL is actually covertly weak second-order! To see why, consider that the truth condition of the
spatial conditional ( ) involves universal quantiﬁcation over (adjoint) protocols, which, and that is the reason, generate
via their execution ﬁnite sets of messages (CPL’s ofﬁcial ﬁrst-order individuals). The implicit (at the meta-level) and indirect
(via the spatial conditional and protocols) universal quantiﬁcation over ﬁnite sets of individuals inducesweak second-order
expressiveness.18 Regarding secrecy, wewill see in Section 3.2 that the source of its undecidability is nicely pinpointed by the
prohibition (negated permission) modality, which employs the (negated) spatial conditional, required for its formalisation.
17 However, FOL-satisﬁability is undecidable.
18 That a certain form of spatial conjunction (conjunctive separation) also yields second-order expressiveness has been argued in [67].
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Table 6
Deriving a plaintext
 · I(Eve,{∣∣M∣∣}
k
) · I(Eve,k) {I(Eve,k)}Eve (Eve,k)
 · I(Eve,{∣∣M∣∣}
k
) · I(Eve,k) {I(Eve,k)}Eve k
 · I(Eve,{∣∣M∣∣}
k
) {I(Eve,
{∣∣M∣∣}
k
)}
Eve (Eve,
{∣∣M∣∣}
k
)
 · I(Eve,{∣∣M∣∣}
k
) {I(Eve,
{∣∣M∣∣}
k
)}
Eve
{∣∣M∣∣}
k
 · I(Eve,{∣∣M∣∣}
k
) · I(Eve,k) {I(Eve,
{∣∣M∣∣}
k
)}
Eve
{∣∣M∣∣}
k
 · I(Eve,{∣∣M∣∣}
k
) · I(Eve,k) {I(Eve,k),I(Eve,
{∣∣M∣∣}
k
)}
Eve M
In CPL, weak second-order expressiveness is available on demand of the spatial conditional and remains nicely conﬁned to
the use of that conditional.
2.3.2. Relevant implication
In the terminology of relevant logics, both the spatial conditional  and the epistemic conditional ⊇ are relevant (as
opposed to the truth-functional material conditional →) in the sense that information based on which the antecedent is
evaluated is relevant to the information based on which the consequent is evaluated. In  , the relevant (and potential)
information is represented by the adjoint state (h
′
,Q ). In⊇, the relevant (and actual) information is represented by the event
subset Eφ′ .
As an example, consider (session identiﬁer and process term omitted) the assertion
 · I(Eve,{∣∣M∣∣}
k
) |= Eve k k Eve k M
which states what primary knowledge, namely k, Eve requires to derive the (secondary) knowledgeM in the given model. In
other words, if Eve knew k then Eve would know M in the given model. (Notice the conditional mode!) This is a property of
Eve’s cryptographic knowledgew.r.t. its potentiality. That is, the addition of information potentially leads to multiplication of
knowledge.
In comparison, consider the assertion
 · I(Eve,{∣∣M∣∣}
k
) · I(Eve,k) |= Eve k M ⊇ Eve k k
which states how Eve actually derives the secondary knowledgeM from the primary knowledge in the givenmodel (cf. Table 6,
where it becomes evident that if Eve knows the plaintext M then possibly because Eve knows the key k, because: ﬁrst, Eve
can derive M from the set {I(Eve,k),I(Eve,{∣∣M∣∣}
k
)} of events and k from the set {I(Eve,k)} of events in her view; and second,
{I(Eve,k)} ⊆ {I(Eve,k),I(Eve,{∣∣M∣∣}
k
)}). In other words, if Eve knows M then possibly (not only probably) because Eve knows k
in the given model. (Notice the indicative mode!) This is a property of Eve’s cryptographic knowledge w.r.t. its actuality. In
contrast, consider the tautology (i.e., universal assertion)
|= (Eve k {∣∣M∣∣}
k
∧ Eve k k) → Eve k M
which states a property of a cryptographic operation, namely encryption. We believe that  and ⊇ are (perhaps the) two
natural – and incidentally, relevant – notions of implication for cryptographic knowledge.
2.3.3. Conﬂicting obligations
Aparticularly interestinguseof the spatial and theepistemicconditional is thedeﬁnitionof a cryptographicallymeaningful
notion of permission (cf. Table 4) and prohibition (cf. Appendix A). Our deﬁnition says that it is permitted that φ is true if
and only if if φ were true then whenever a state of violation would be reached, it would not be due to φ being true. This
(reductionistic) notion of permission is inspired by [77, P. 9] where a notion of prohibition is deﬁned in the framework of
dynamic logic. The authors resume their basic idea as “. . . some action is forbidden if doing the action leads to a state of
violation.” Observe that [77] construe a notion of prohibition based on actions, whereas we construe a notion of permission
based on propositions. We recall that the motivation of reductionistic approaches to (standard) deontic logic (SDL) is the
existence of weak paradoxes in SDL. That is, SDL actually contains true statements that are counter to the normative intuition
it was originally intended to capture.
In SDL permission, prohibition, and obligation are interdeﬁnable, whereas in CPL only permission and prohibition are. In
fact, there is nonotionof obligation inCPLbecause (faulty) cryptographicprotocols create a contextwith conﬂicting obligations
whose treatment would require machinery from defeasible deontic logic [83]. Consider that it must be obligatory that (1)
a state of violation be never reached during protocol execution, and (2) agents always comply with protocol prescription.
These two obligations are obviously conﬂicting in a context created by the execution of a faulty protocol, which by deﬁnition
does reach a state of violation.
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2.3.4. Logical omniscience
Our semantics for the epistemic modality reconciles the cryptographically intuitive but incomplete semantics from [14]
with the complete (but less computational), renaming semantics from [31]. We achieve this by casting the cryptographic
intuition from [14] in a simple (rule-based) and visibly computational formulation of epistemic accessibility. Similarly to
[14], we parse unintelligible data in an agent’s a individual knowledgeM into abstract messages. In addition, and inspired
by [32,31], we parse unintelligible data in an agent’s a propositional knowledge Ka(φ). Thanks to this additional parsing,
our epistemic modality avoids weak paradoxes in the context of Dolev–Yao cryptography that, like in SDL, exist in standard
epistemic logic (SEL). In the context of Dolev–Yao cryptography, these paradoxes are due to epistemic necessitation
|= φ
|= Ka(φ)
i.e., the fact that an agent a knows all logical truths (logical omniscience) such as ∃v({∣∣M∣∣}
k
= {∣∣v∣∣}
k
). To illustrate, consider the
following simple example. Let P ∈ P and M ∈ M. Then paradoxically (,P) |= Ka(∃v(
{∣∣M∣∣}
k
= {∣∣v∣∣}
k
)) “in” SEL but truthfully
(,P) |= Ka(∃v(
{∣∣M∣∣}
k
= {∣∣v∣∣}
k
)) in CPL because |= ¬∃v( = {∣∣v∣∣}
k
) (cf. “otherwise”-clause in the truth denotation of Ka(φ) in
Table 4). In a cryptographic setting, epistemic necessitation should — and in CPL does — take the following form [31]:
|= φ
|= a k M → Ka(φ) M is a tuple of the key values in φ
In the context of Dolev–Yao cryptography, the presence of logical omniscience in SEL seems, interestingly, to be due
to the absence of relevance in the truth condition of the epistemic modality. The condition is in fact a truth-functional
(meta-level) implication, which is true whenever its consequent is true, which in turn is always the case for a tautological
consequent. Therefore, any solution to the problem of logical omniscience must break the truth-functionality of the meta-
level implication andmake it relevant. This is precisely what we do: the relevant information is represented by the history h
of protocol statep@i from the antecedent, used for cryptographic parsing in the consequent. Note that our truth condition for
the epistemicmodality is a simpliﬁcation of the one of [32,31] in the sense thatwe eliminate one universal quantiﬁer (the one
over renamings) thanks to the employment of cryptographic parsing. Further note that our epistemic modality does capture
knowledge, i.e., |= Ka(φ) → φ, due to the reﬂexivity of its associated accessibility relation. Treating logical omniscience has
a price:
Proposition 2. Logical equivalence (⇔) is not a congruence.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
2.3.5. Other connections
What is more, our (basic) location predicate a@x enables us to invent, by macro-deﬁnition, spatial freeze quantiﬁers (in
analogy to the well-known temporal freeze quantiﬁers, which we are also able to macro-deﬁne, analogously, in the real-
time setting, cf. Section 4.3): a.x(φ) :=(a@x → φ) and a.x(φ) := ¬a.x¬(φ), and further a(φ) := ∀x(a.x(φ)) which
corresponds to the location modality @a[φ] of distributed temporal logic [38]. Spatial freeze quantiﬁers are, for example,
useful for the macro-deﬁnition of action predicates restricted to particular sessions, e.g., a.x
M−→
Eve
b := a.x(a M−→Eve b).
Finally, the popularity of strand spaces [46] as an execution model for cryptographic protocols justiﬁes that we brieﬂy
compare our classical, trace-based execution model to strand spaces. According to [46, Deﬁnition 2.2], a strand space over
a set of message terms (in our case M) is a set (say S) (of strand names) with a so-called trace mapping tr : S → (±M)* ,
where ±M := { +M | M ∈ M } ∪ { −M | M ∈ M } designates the set of so-called signed message terms. In our terminology,
the intended meaning of a strand (name) is the one of a located session name (a.x), and the one of a positive (resp. negative)
message term is insecure output (resp. input). With these intended meanings and S := { a.x | a ∈ AEve and x ∈ X }, strands
(and its concept) are obviously strictly included in our (concept of) traces of insecure and secure message input/output
events. The inclusion is strict because [46, Deﬁnition 2.2] does not allow for secure message input/ouput.
3. Application: formalisation case studies
We exemplify the expressiveness of CPL on a selection of tentative formalisations of fundamental cryptographic states of
affairs. To the best of our knowledge, (1) no other existing crypto logic is sufﬁciently expressive to allow for the deﬁnition
of the totality of these properties, and (2) the totality of these properties has never been expressed before in any other
formalism. In fact, entire logics (e.g. [16,91,62]) have been designed to capture a single cryptographic state of affairs (e.g.,
authenticity, anonymity, resp. secrecy).We invite the reader to validate our formalisations on the criteria of intuitiveness and
succinctness, but also to discern that the simplicity of the formalisation results is in sharp contradistinction to the difﬁculty
of their formalisation process. However, thanks to the empowerment that CPL confers, a formalisation process involving
such a large number of conceptual degrees of freedom has become tractable at an engineering level. Observe that (1) our
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formalisations of cryptographic states of affairs, except for the one of key separation and those of trust-related affairs, involve
no actions, just pure knowledge; and (2) our formalisations, when poly-dimensional modal (like most of them), demonstrate
that the corresponding properties are inexpressible in (in particular, the cited)mono-dimensionalmodal logics. Note that the
formalisations employ macro-deﬁned predicates (cf. Appendix A; the reader is urged to consult it) and that α(b) abbreviates
disjunction of name generation, sending, and receiving performed by b.
3.1. Trust-related affairs
Maliciousness Agent b ismalicious, writtenmalicious(b), :iff b knowingly performs a forbidden action at some time, written
(α(b) ∧ Fα(b) ∧ Kb(Fα(b))).
Honesty Agent b is honest, written honest(b), :iff b is not malicious, written ¬malicious(b).
Faultiness b is faulty, written faulty(b), :iff b performs a forbidden action at some time, written (α(b) ∧ Fα(b)).
Prudency b is prudent, written prudent(b), :iff b is not faulty, written ¬faulty(b).
Trustworthiness Agent a trusts b, written a trusts b, :iff a knows that b is prudent, written Ka(prudent(b)).19
3.2. Conﬁdentiality-related affairs
Shared Secret Datum M is a shared secret among agents a and b, written M sharedSecret (a,b), :iff only a and b know M,
written a k M ∧ b k M ∧ ∀(c : AAdv)(c k M → (c = a ∨ c = b)).
Secrecy A protocol has the (reachability-based) secrecy property :iff the adversary Eve never knows any classiﬁed informa-
tion, written∀m(F(Eve k m) → ¬ Eve k m).
Our formalisation is an instance of the pattern Fφ → ¬φ, relating illegitimate to actual states of affairs, and expressing
that if something must not be then it actually is not. The pattern is equivalent to φ → Pφ.
Other forms of secrecy can be obtained with the epistemic modality KEve.
Anonymity Agent b is anonymous to agent a in state of affairs φ(b) :iff if a knows that some agent is involved in φ then a
cannot identify that agent with b, written Ka(∃(c : A)(φ(c))) → ¬Ka(φ(b)), which is logically equivalent to ¬Ka(φ(b)).
Data Derivation Agent b knows M′ due to agent a knowing M (when a /= b then necessarily due to communication from a
to b), writtenM′ ⊇(a,b) M := b k M′ ∧ (b k M′ ⊇ a k M)20 (when a = bwe just writeM′ ⊇a M).
Non-Interaction There is absence of interaction between agents a and b, written a | b := ¬∃m∃m′(m ⊇(a,b) m′ ∨m ⊇(b,a) m′).
Perfect Forward Secrecy “[. . .] compromise of long-term keys [k] does not compromise past session keys [k′].” [82, P. 496],
written ¬ ∃(k : K∞)∃(k′ : K1)(k′ ⊇Eve k).
Known-Key Attack “[. . .] an adversary obtains some keys used previously and then uses this information to determine new
keys.” [82, P. 41], written ∃(k : CK)∃(k′ : CK)(k′ /= k ∧ k′ ⊇Eve k).
Agent Corruption The adversary, somehow, comes to know all what an agent (say a) knows in state of affairs φ, written
∀m(a k m → (Eve k m φ)).
3.3. Authentication-related affairs
Key Conﬁrmation “[. . .] one party [a] is assured that a second (possibly unidentiﬁed) party [b] actually has possession of a
particular secret21 key [k].” [82, P. 492], written k : K ∧ Ka(b k k).
Key Authentication
• implicit: “[. . .] one party [a] is assured that no other party [c] aside from a speciﬁcally identiﬁed second party [b]
(and possibly additional identiﬁed trusted parties) may gain access to a particular secret key [k].” [82, P. 492], written
k : K ∧ Ka(∀(c : AAdv)(c k k → (c = a ∨ c = b))).
• explicit: “[. . .] both (implicit) key authentication andkey conﬁrmationhold.” [82, P. 492],written simply as conjunction
of implicit key authentication and key conﬁrmation.
Message Integrity Agent b knows thatM is an intact message from agent a, written Kb(M ⊇(a,b) M).
Message Authorship Agent a authored datum M, written a authored M, :iff once a was the only one to know M, written
− (a k M ∧ ∀(b : AAdv)(b k M → b = a)).
Message Authentication (or Authenticity) Datum M is authentic w.r.t. its origin (say agent a) from the viewpoint of agent
b :iff b can authentically attribute (i.e., in the sense of authorship) M to a, i.e., b knows that a authored M, written
Kb(a authored M).
Key Transport (safety) between agents a and b initiated by a
• unacknowledged uaKT(a,b):
∀(k : K)(Kb(a authored k) → Kb(k sharedSecret (a,b)))
19 This is about justiﬁed trust (a rightly trusts b) as opposed to blind trust (a possibly wrongly trusts b).
20 A material conditional would not do here because the antecedent and the consequent are epistemically — and thus not truth-functionally — related via
data derivation.
21 In our terminology, ‘secret’ here means ‘symmetric’.
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• acknowledged aKT(a,b):
∀(k : K)(Ka(Kb(a authored k)) → Ka(Kb(k sharedSecret (a,b))))
Key Agreement (safety) between agents a and b initiated by a
• unacknowledged uaKA(a,b):
∀ma∀mb((Kb(a authored ma) ∧ Ka(b authored mb)) →
Ka((ma,mb) sharedSecret (a,b)))
• acknowledged aKA(a,b):
∀ma∀mb((Kb(a authored ma) ∧ Kb(Ka(b authored mb))) →
Kb(Ka((ma,mb) sharedSecret (a,b))))
Entity Authentication (or Identiﬁcation) (safety) via a shared secret between agents a and b initiated by a
• unilateral (or weak) entity authentication uEA(a,b): “[ . . . ] the process whereby one party [b] is assured (through
acquisition of corroborative evidence [m]) of the identity of a second party [a] involved in a protocol, and that the
second has actually participated (i.e., is active at, or immediately prior to, the time the evidence is acquired).” [82,
P. 386], written
∀m(Kb(a authored m) → Kb(m sharedSecret (a,b)))
Notice that unilateral entity authentication is unacknowledged transport of an arbitrary secret, e.g., not necessarily
a symmetric key.
• weakly mutual (or strong-weak) entity authentication wmEA(a,b): “[. . .] [one party (say a)] has fresh assurance that
[the other party (say b)] has knowledge of [a] as her peer entity.” [25, P. 39], written
∀ma∀mb((Kb(a authored ma) ∧ Kb(Ka(b authored mb))) →
Kb(Ka((ma,mb) sharedSecret (a,b))))
Notice that weakly mutual entity authentication coincides with acknowledged key agreement.
• strongly mutual (or strong-strong) entity authentication smEA(a,b):
∀ma∀mb((Ka(Kb(a authored ma)) ∧ Kb(Ka(b authored mb))) →
Ka(Kb(Ka((ma,mb) sharedSecret (a,b)))))
Notice that our formalisations of key transport/agreement and entity authentication only address safety, but not liveness, i.e.,
that some key actually gets transported/agreed upon and that some entity is authenticated. The reason is that due to the
adversary, liveness cannot be guaranteed.
Visibly, both key transport/agreement and entity authentication rely onmessage authentication aswell as a shared secret,
and authentication-related affairs rely on conﬁdentiality-related affairs.
Slogan 9. Authenticity is epistemic accessibility between agents and their data. Secrecy is epistemic inaccessibility to agents
and their data. The two states of affairs are linked.
3.4. Commitment-related affairs
Proof Datum M is a cryptographic22 proof for the truth of proposition φ, written M proofFor φ, :iff assuming an arbitrary
agent a knowsM guarantees that a knows that φ is true, written ∀(a : AAdv)(a k MKa(φ)).
Evidence Datum M is cryptographic evidence for the truth of proposition φ, written M evidenceFor φ, :iff assuming an
arbitrary agent a knows that φ is true guarantees that a knowsM, written ∀(a : AAdv)(Ka(φ) a k M).
Provability Agent a can prove that proposition φ is true, written Pa(φ), :iff a knows a (cryptographic) proof for φ, written
∃m(m proofFor φ ∧ a k m).
Non-Repudiation Agentbcannot repudiateauthorshipofM toagenta :iffacanprove thatbauthoredM,writtenPa(b authored
M).
Notice that non-repudiation is authenticity strengthened (from knowledge) to provability.
22 As opposed to propositional proof (i.e., a sequence of propositions that is compliant with a relation of deduction); cryptographic proofs can be viewed
as cryptographic encodings (i.e., cryptographic Gödel-numberings) of propositional proofs.
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Contract Signing “[. . .] two players [say a and b] wish to sign a contractm in such a way that either each player obtains the
other’s signature [S], or neither player does.” (fair exchange of electronic signatures FEES(a,b)), written ((a k Sb ∧ b k
Sa) ∨ (¬ a k Sb ∧ ¬ b k Sa))
• Optimism: “[. . .]nohonestparty [neitheranorb] interactswith the trusted thirdparty [say c].” [13],writtena | c ∧ b | c
• Fairness: “[. . .] it is infeasible for the adversary [Eve] to get the honest player’s [a] signature [Sa], without the honest
player getting the adversary’s signature [SEve].” [13], written(Eve k Sa → (a k SEve))
• Completion: “[. . .] it is infeasible for the adversary [. . .] to prevent [a] and [b] from successfully exchanging their
signatures.” [13], writtten (a k Sb ∧ b k Sa)
• Accountability: “[. . .] if the trusted third party misbehaves [i.e., the contract signing property FEES is violated] then
this can be proven.” [13], written(¬FEES(a,b) → (Pa(¬FEES(a,b)) ∧ Pb(¬FEES(a,b))))
• Abuse-freeness: “[. . .] [b] does not obtain publicly veriﬁable information about (honest) [a] signing the contract until
[b] is also bound by the contract.”23 [50], written ¬Pb(a authored Sa) U b authored Sb.
It has been argued that contract signing requires branching time [35]. However, our tentative formalisation of contract
signing suggests that branching-time logic is not necessary for this purpose. It has even been argued that linear-time is
preferable (implying “sufﬁcient”) over branching-time logic in general [93]. We shall not settle this argument here, but
conﬁneourselves toalimenting it. Inanycase, itwouldbeeasy to replaceCPL’s linear-timeskeletonwithabranching-time
skeleton such as CTL* .
Visibly, cryptographic proof and evidence are dual concepts, and commitment-related affairs rely on authentication-related
affairs.
Then, we have actually been able tomacro-deﬁne a Gödel-style provability modality, and, with it, are able tomacro-deﬁne
the intuitionistic conditional in CPL!
Theorem 2. TheoperatorPa is compliantwith themodal system S4 adapted toDolev–Yao cryptography (i.e.,with thenecessitation
rule N replaced by NDY).24
Proof. Pa complies with (cf. Appendix B for an elementary, Fitch-style proof)
K |= Pa(φ → φ′) → (Pa(φ) → Pa(φ′))
T |= Pa(φ) → φ
4 |= Pa(φ) → Pa(Pa(φ))
NDY
|= φ
|= a k M → Pa(φ) M is a tuple of the key values in φ . 
Hence, (the classical logic) CPL can capture the provability meaning of intuitionistic implication via the following macro-
deﬁnition:
φ →a φ′ := Pa(φ → φ′)
The intuitionistic conditional is another example of relevant implication: information (a proof of φ) based on which the
antecedent is evaluated is relevant to the information (a proof of φ′) based onwhich the consequent is evaluated in the sense
that any proof of φ is also a proof of φ′ (cf. K).
Theobvious temptation is toattemptaCurry–Howard isomorphism [40]betweencryptographicprotocols andpropositions.
That is, to look
(1) at a proposition φ ∈ F for which there are (h,P),(h′,P′) ∈ H× P , a ∈ AEve, andM ∈ M s.t. (h,P) −→ (h′,P′) and (h′,P′) |=
M proofFor φ ∧ a k M as a type for process term P, and
(2) at process term P as an interactive proof procedure (to the beneﬁt of agent a) for the cryptographic proof M of φ.
Our (macro-deﬁned) concepts of cryptographic proof and provability are related to [9], where a notion of justiﬁcation for
propositional knowledge is introduced as a primitive concept in the (propositional) epistemic logic S4 resulting in a hybrid
modality for both knowledge and provability. That notion of justiﬁcation roughly corresponds in our (ﬁrst-order, epistemic-
S5) setting to the notion of cryptographic proof. However, [9] is currently not quite suitable for cryptography due to standard
epistemic necessitation and an unsuitable form of positive introspection, namely the one that the existence of a proof of a
proposition implies the (hybrid) knowledge-provability of that proposition. Hence, given that Gödel’s 1933 paper on amodal
logic of provability left the25 open problem of ﬁnding “a precise provability semantics for themodal logic S4” [29, P. 932], we
can justly claim having solved via macro-deﬁnition, i.e., via syntactic translation, a cryptographic analogue of that problem.
Gödel’s problem was solved in its original, non-cryptographic format in [11,12].
23 Symmetrically for “(honest) [b]”.
24 As Pa is deﬁned in terms of Ka , Pa is compliant with S4 simpliciter when Ka is compliant with S5 simpliciter. Our Ka can be (re)made compliant with S5
simpliciter by simply removing the treatment of logical omniscience (i.e., the cryptographic parsing) in its deﬁnition.
25 Actually two open problems (cf. [29, P. 932]).
76 S. Kramer / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 77 (2008) 60–91
Table 7
Protocol narration for core NSPuK
1. Alice → Bob : {∣∣(xAlice,Alice)∣∣}+p+Bob
2. Bob → Alice : {∣∣(xAlice,xBob)∣∣}+p+Alice
3. Alice → Bob : {∣∣xBob∣∣}+p+Bob
3.5. Compositionality-related affairs
Key Separation The protocol space can be separated in an establishment (production) and a use (consumption) part w.r.t.
the key k, written
∀m((∃(a,b : A)(a m−→
Eve
b) ∧ k*m) → ¬ k*m) ⊗
∀m((∃(a,b : A)(a m−→
Eve
b) ∧ k*m) → ¬ k*m)
Compositional Correctness Protocol (plug-in) P with prehistory h is
(1) solely correct w.r.t. an internal correctness criterion, i.e., endo-condition φ :iff (h,P) |= φ
(2) compositionally correct, i.e., either
(a) existentially composablew.r.t. an external correctness criterion, i.e., exo-condition φ′ :iff (h,P) |= φ′  φ,26 or
(b) conditionally composable, i.e., composable w.r.t. exo-condition φ′, :iff (h,P) |= φ′  φ, or
(c) universally composable :iff (h,P) |= φ.27
The concept of an exo-condition (endo-condition) is to interactive programs what a pre-condition (post-
condition) is to non-interactive programs.28 Our slogan, especially applying to cryptographic protocols, is:
Slogan 10. Stating the possibly weakest exo-condition for an interactive program is at least as necessary as stating the
possibly weakest pre-condition for a non-interactive program.
Attack Scenario Protocol P with prehistory h and internal correctness criterion φ is vulnerable in a protocol context – de
facto constituting a potential attack scenario —with property φ′ :iff (h,P) |= φ′  ¬φ.
Notice that a statement of an attack scenario is a negated statement of conditional composability.
Remark 4. The concept of a chosen-protocol attack [71], understoodas the adversarial choice of adifferent (attacking) protocol
than P is an instance of the concept of an attack scenario, and understood as the adversarial choice of an arbitrary attacking
protocol coincides with the concept of an attack scenario.
3.5.1. A popular attack scenario
Weexemplify our concept of attack scenariowith theperhapsmost popular attackona cryptographic protocol, namely the
man-in-the-middleattackon theNeedham-Schroederpublic-keyprotocol (NSPuK) for (weaklymutual) entityauthentication
(acknowledged key agreement). Our choice is motivated by the fact that we wish to explain the unfamiliar (our approach)
with the familiar (a paradigmatic attack). Notwithstanding the popularity of the attack, we believe that its contextual for-
malisation in CPL explicates it to a novel extent of explicitness. The attack is also particularly interesting because the protocol
requirement that it violates is particularly challenging to formalise — satisfactorily. We contend that common formulations
of entity authentication are unsatisfactory. They usually purport to formalise an intuition expressed as “I know who I’m
talking to.”. However the actual formulations then only involve belief to varying degrees of explicitness [74]. Our slogan, and
fact, is:
Slogan 11. Debatable requirements entail debatable attacks.
Table 7 displays the protocol narration (i.e., an intended run) of core NSPuK, i.e., NSPuK where the public keys of the
initiator (e.g., Alice) and the responder (i.e., Bob) are assumed to have already been established. The narration describes
(elliptically) that ﬁrst, Alice sends to Bob the encryption under Bob’s public key p+Bob of a tuple of a freshly-generated
nonce xAlice and her name Alice; (upon reception, Bob decrypts the message with his private key, stores the ﬁrst com-
ponent of the tuple, gets the public key p+Alice corresponding to the second component from his key store, generates a
fresh nonce xBob, and encrypts the tuple of Alice’s and his nonce with Alice’s public key;) second, Bob sends his reply
to Alice; (upon reception, Alice decrypts the message with her private key, checks that the ﬁrst component of the tuple
is her nonce previously sent to Bob, and encrypts the second component xBob with Bob’s public key p
+
Bob;) third, Alice
26 The case where φ′ is  is obviously uninteresting.
27 The name of this notion of correctness coincides with the one from [30], and should roughly correspond to the notion of robust satisfaction [52].
28 (h,P) |= φ′φ roughly corresponds to a Hoare triple φ′{P}φ. Observe the absence of a computation history in Hoare triples: non-interactive programs
are characteristically history-independent; interactive programs are characteristically history-dependent!
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Table 8
Protocol template for core NSPuK
NSPuKINIT(slf ,oth) := NSPuKRESP(slf ) :=
New (xslf : X).
Getoth (koth : K+,oth) in Getslf (kslf : K−,slf ) in
Outoth
{∣∣(xslf ,slf )∣∣}+koth . In {∣∣(xoth,oth)∣∣}+kslf when xoth : X ∧ oth : A.
New (xslf : X).
Getslf (kslf : K−,slf ) in Getoth (koth : K+,oth) in
In
{∣∣(xslf ,xoth)∣∣}+kslf when xoth : X. Outoth {∣∣(xoth,xslf )∣∣}+koth .
Outoth
{∣∣xoth∣∣}+koth .1 In {∣∣xslf ∣∣}+kslf .1
NSPuK(init,resp,xinit ,xresp) := init.xinit [NSPuKINIT(init,resp)] |||
resp.xresp [NSPuKRESP(resp)]
Table 9
Prehistory for core NSPuK
h :=  · N(Alice,xa0,pAlice,Alice) · N(Bob,xb0,pBob,Bob)·
sO(Alice,xa0,p
+
Alice,Bob) · sI(Bob,xb0,p+Alice,Alice)·
sO(Bob,xb0,p
+
Bob,Alice) · sI(Alice,xa0,p+Bob,Bob)·
sO(Alice,xa0,p
+
Alice,Eve) · sI(Eve,xe0,p+Alice,Alice)·
sO(Bob,xb0,p
+
Bob,Eve) · sI(Eve,xe0,p+Bob,Bob)
sends her reply to Bob. Protocol narrations are elliptical in the sense that non-interactive protocol actions are visibly not
explicit.
The intention of each protocol step is as follows: the intention of the ﬁrst step is to challenge the responder (e.g., Bob)
to authenticate with the initiator (e.g., Alice); the intention of the second step is twofold, i.e., to accomplish authentication
of the responder with the initiator, and to challenge the initiator to authenticate with the responder; the intention of
the third step is twofold, i.e., to acknowledge authentication of the responder with the initiator to the responder, and
to accomplish authentication of the initiator with the responder. The protocol intends to achieve weakly (due to the
unilateral acknowledgement) mutual entity authentication (acknowledged key agreement) between an initiator and a
responder.
The protocol narration of NSPuK can be transcribed into a (non-elliptic) formal language, for example into the one of
[24,69] by instantiating the protocol template displayed in Table 8 via substitution of Alice for init and Bob for resp. Features
of that language are: a primitive for key lookup, an input primitive with pattern-matching and guard, and primitives for
out-of-band communication. The left (right) column of the table deﬁnes the initiator (responder) role. The bottom row
deﬁnes the protocol template, distributing (via parallel composition) the roles at the corresponding locations init.xinit [·] and
resp.xresp [·], respectively. The protocol template assumes that each agent has generated her own private and public key, and
that each agent’s public key has been established with the other agent. The actions of the initiator role are the following:
New (xslf : X) generation – and binding in variable xslf – of a new nonce; Getoth (koth : K+,oth) in look up – and binding in
variable koth – of the other agent’s (cf. subscript oth) public key generated by the other agent herself (cf. parameter oth);
Outoth
{∣∣(xslf ,slf )∣∣}+koth output of the message {∣∣(xslf ,slf )∣∣}+koth to the other, hopefully responding, agent; Getslf (kslf : K−,slf ) in
look up – and binding in variable kslf – of the local agent’s (cf. subscript slf ) private key generated by that agent herself (cf.
parameter slf ); In
{∣∣(xslf ,xoth)∣∣}+kslf when xoth : X guarded (cf. guard xoth : X) input of amessagewith pattern29 {∣∣(xslf ,xoth)∣∣}+kslf and
binding in variable xoth of the other, apparently responding, agent’s nonce; Outoth
{∣∣xoth∣∣}+koth output of the message {∣∣xoth∣∣}+koth
to the other agent; and, ﬁnally, 1 – termination. The actions of the responder role are (almost) symmetrical to the ones of
the initiator role.
The previously mentioned assumptions about preliminary generation and (authenticated, of course) establishment of
public keys can bemodelled bymeans of corresponding key-generation and out-of-band communication events, chained up
to form the protocol prehistory displayed in Table 9. We recall that out-of-band (or private) communication is, by deﬁnition,
authenticated (and secret), and that the adversary (Eve) can, as in the mentioned attack, also be an insider.
29 With pattern-matching effectuating the identity check on the received nonce.
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Table 10
Attack narration for NSPuK
1. Alice → Eve : {∣∣(xAlice,Alice)∣∣}+p+Eve
1′. EveAlice → Bob :
{∣∣(xAlice,Alice)∣∣}+p+Bob
2′. Bob → EveAlice :
{∣∣(xAlice,xBob)∣∣}+p+Alice
2. Eve → Alice : {∣∣(xAlice,xBob)∣∣}+p+Alice
3. Alice → Eve : {∣∣xBob∣∣}+p+Eve
3′. EveAlice → Bob :
{∣∣xBob∣∣}+p+Bob
This completes the deﬁnition of the initial state
(h,NSPuK(Alice,Bob,xa1,xb1))
of (our attack scenario for) core NSPuK.
Table 10 displays the narration of the actual attack.
The attack can be orchestrated by an active insider adversary that performs denial of service and impersonation across two
different, interleaved sessions, cf. (un)primed numbering. It consists in:
(1) Eve tricking (wrongly trusting) Alice (believing that Eve is a legitimate agent) to initiate a regular session
Q := Alice.xa2 [NSPuKINIT(Alice,Eve)]
with Eve
(2) Eve disabling the execution (denial of service) of the regular session initiation
Alice.xa1 [NSPuKINIT(Alice,Bob)]
(3) Eve impersonating Alice in the face of (wrongly trusting) Bob (lead to believe that he is talking only to Alice while in
fact talking also to Eve) by enabling the execution of the regular session response
Bob.xb1 [NSPuKRESP(Bob)]
concurrently with Q .
In result, Alice is lead tobelieve that she is talkingonly toEve (via session xa2)while in fact talkingalso toBob (via impersonator
Eve and session xb1), and Bob is lead to believe that he is talking only to Alice (via session xb1) while in fact talking also to
Eve (via impersonator Eve and session xa1). The protocol obviously fails to achieve its requirement.
The assumption about private- and public-key generation and public-key establishment is, of course, also valid for Eve
and regular interactions between Alice and Eve, respectively. That is, the protocol context is assumed to contain the pre-
history h
′ :=  · N(Eve,xe0,pEve,Eve) · sO(Eve,xe0,p+Eve,Alice) · sI(Alice,xa0,p+Eve,Eve) · sO(Eve,xe0,p+Eve,Bob) · sI(Bob,xb0,p+Eve,Eve).
More formally,
• (h′,Q ) ∈ H× P and
• (h′,Q ) |= uEA(Alice,Eve) and
• (h ◦ h′,NSPuK(Alice,Bob,xa1,xb1)|||Q ) |= ¬wmEA(Alice,Bob)
by which we obtain
(h,NSPuK(Alice,Bob,xa1,xb1)) |= uEA(Alice,Eve)¬wmEA(Alice,Bob)
representing our (property-based or logical) attack scenario for NSPuK. We invite the reader to compare this scenario to the
corresponding, model-based (or process-algebraic) attack scenario described in [24,69].
4. tCPL: an extension of CPL with real time
We extend (core) CPL (qualitative time) with real time, i.e., time stamps, timed keys, and potentially drifting local
clocks, to tCPL (quantitative time). Our extension is conservative and really simple (a single section is enough to describe
it!). It requires only the reﬁnement of two relational symbols (one new deﬁning rule resp. parameter) and of one modal-
ity (one new conjunct in its truth condition), and the addition of two relational symbols (but no operators!). Our work
thus provides further evidence for Lamport’s claim that adding real time to an untimed formalism is really simple [73].
The special-purpose machinery for timed (including cryptographic) settings need not be built from scratch nor be heavy-
weight.
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4.1. Historical and topical context
The formal speciﬁcation,modelling, and veriﬁcation of general-purpose timed systemshas received considerable attention
from the formal methods community since the end of the nineteen-eighties. See [94] for a survey of timed system models
(automata, Petri nets), model- and property-based speciﬁcation languages (process calculi, resp. logics), and veriﬁcation
tools; and [26] for a survey of timed property-based speciﬁcation languages (logics).
However, the formal methods community has paid comparatively little, and only recent (since the end of the nineteen-
nineties), attention to the timed aspects of cryptographic systems, e.g., cryptographic protocols,whichdue to their complexity
deserve special-purposemodels, and formalisms30 for their speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation.
We are aware of the following special-purpose formalisms for timed cryptographic protocols.
• Model-based formalisms (process calculi): [45], [55], [61] with discrete time; [88], [20], and our own contribution
[21,69] with dense time.
• Property-based formalisms (logics): interval-based [63]; time-parametrised epistemic modalities [66] and a second-
order logic [20] both point-based, and our hereby presented logic tCPL allowing for both temporal points and intervals.
Clearly, “[d]ense-timemodels are better for distributed systemswithmultiple clocks and timers, which can be tested, set,
and reset independently.” [94]. Speciﬁcally in cryptographic systems, “[c]locks can become unsynchronized due to sabotage
on or faults in the clocks or the synchronizationmechanism, such as overﬂows and the dependence on potentially unreliable
clocks on remote sites [. . .]” [59]. Moreover, “[e]rroneous behaviors are generally expected during clock failures [. . .]” [59].
Timed logics can be classiﬁed w.r.t. their order and the nature of their temporal domain.
4.1.1. Order
Propositional logic is simply too weak for speciﬁcation purposes (but is good for fully-automated, approximative ver-
iﬁcation); modal logics provide powerful abstractions for speciﬁcation purposes, but are still not expressive enough (cf.
Section 1.2); higher-order logics are too expressive at the cost of axiomatic and algorithmic incompleteness (but are good as
logical frameworks); ﬁnally “[f]irst-order logics seem a good compromise between expressiveness and computability, since
they are [axiomatically] complete in general.” [94]. We recall that core CPL is a ﬁrst-order, poly-dimensional modal (norms,
knowledge, space, qualitative time) logic.
4.1.2. Temporal domain
We recall that core CPL can be instantiatedwith a transitive, irreﬂexive, linear and bounded in the past, possibly branching
(but a priori ﬂattened) and unbounded (depending on the protocol) in the future, discrete (due to event-induced pro-
tocol states) temporal accessibility relation [24,69]. That is, CPL has a hybrid (state- and event-based) temporal domain:
“[ . . . ] neither pure state-based nor pure event-based languages quite support the natural expressiveness desirable for
the speciﬁcation of real-world systems [ . . . ]” [94]. tCPL can be instantiated with a temporal accessibility relation that
additionally accounts for quantitative time [21,69]. That is, time is (1) rational-number valued, yielding a dense temporal
grain; (2) referenced explicitly (the truth of a timed formula does not depend on its evaluation time), but implicit-time
operators are macro-deﬁnable (cf. Section 4.3); (3) measured with potentially drifting local clocks (one per agent), where
the (standard Dolev–Yao) adversary’s local clock has drift rate 1; (4) advanced monotonically by letting the adversary
choose the amount by which she desires to increase her local clock (de facto the system clock); and (5) determinant for
adversarial break of short-term keys, enabled jointly by key expiration and ciphertext-only attacks (the weakest reasonable
attack).
Rational versus real numbers Cryptographicmessages have ﬁnite length,which implies that real numbers, e.g., real-valued
time stamps, are not transmittable as such, and real clocks only have ﬁnite precision.
Timed adversary model Ourmodel amounts toanatural generalisationof theadversary’s schedulingpower fromthecontrol
of the (relative) temporalorder of protocol events in thenetwork (space) to the control of their (absolute) temporal issuing
(time).
The following section describes the extension of CPL to tCPL. The extension depends on the core described in the previous
sections (the reader is urged to consult them) and parallels the extension from C3 [24,69] to tC3 [21,69].
4.2. Extension
The notion of execution from [21,69], which we adopt as the temporal accessibility relation for tCPL, generates the
following two kinds of timed events: N(a,x,n,(o,V)) for the generation of name nwith intended owners o and temporal validity
V := (tb,te) for the declaration of the intended beginning (tb) and end (te) of validity of the generated name (typically a key)
by agent a in session x, and S(a,x,t) for the setting of a’s local clock to clock value t by a in session x. By convention, these events
30 In our view, a formalism consists of exactly three components: a formal (e.g., programming or logical) language, amathematicalmodel (or interpretation
structure), and a formal semantics (e.g., effect or truth) for the language in terms of the model.
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are unobservable by the adversary, i.e., they are secure. t ∈ CV :=Q denotes clock values having the associated type CV, and
tb,te ∈ T V := CV ∪ {−∞,∞} denote time values having the associated type TV. Time values are transmittable as messages.
The syntactic and semantic novelties are the following:
(1) addition of two new, binary relational symbols ≤ and @ (overloading the session locality symbol) forming atomic
formulae E ≤ E′ and E@a, for the comparison of temporal expressions (calculation of temporal intervals and bounds)
E ::= t ∣∣ E + E ∣∣ E − E and the testing of agent a’s local clock with time E, respectively. Their truth denotation is as
follows:
[[E ≤ E′]]ip := ([[E]] is smaller than or equal to [[E′]],∅)
where [[·]] designates the obvious evaluation function from temporal expressions to time values (not to be confused
with the function of truth denotation [[·]]ip); and
[[E@a]]ip := ([[E]] = t + δa · ,{S(a,x,t),S(Eve,,ti)})
where
• t designates the clock value of a’s last clock-set event in h, i.e., there are h1,h2, x s.t. h = h1 · S(a,x,t) ◦ h2 and there
is no x′,t′ s.t. S(a,x′,t′) ∈ h˙2
• δa ∈ T V designates the drift rate of a’s local clock
•  designates the temporal difference between Eve’s last clock-set event before S(a,x,t) and Eve’s last clock-set event
so far in h, i.e.,  =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
t2 − t1 if for i ∈ {1,2} there are hi′ ,h′′i , ti s.t.
hi = h′i · S(Eve,,ti) ◦ h′′i and there is no t′i s.t.
S(Eve,,t′
i
) ∈ h˙′′i , and
0 otherwise.
•  serves as a dummy session identiﬁer for Eve’s clock-set events
(2) reﬁnement (i.e., onenewparameter) of the relational symbol fornew-namegeneration  withavalidity tag V := (tb,te)
for the declaration of the intended beginning (tb ∈ T V) and end (te ∈ T V) of validity of the generated name (typically
a key). Its truth denotation is the following:
[[an.o.V)]]ip := (E /= ∅,E) where E := ∪x∈X {N(a,x,n,(o,V))} ∩ h˙
(3) reﬁnement (i.e., adding of onenewdeﬁning rule) of the relationEa⊆ H×M for the derivation of individual knowledge
(cf. Table3)withadversarial breakof short-termkeys (k) enabled jointlyby keyexpiration (expired(k)) and theexistence
of a ciphertext-only attack on the key (h
′ EEve
{∣∣M∣∣}
k
):
h
′ EEve
{∣∣M∣∣}
k
h EEve k
h
′
is a preﬁx of h, and there is t ∈ T V s.t.
h’ |= t@Eve and
h |= expired(k) ∧
∃tv(tv validityOf k ∧ ∃tn(tn@Eve ∧ tv < tn − t))
where tv designates the duration of validity of the considered key (i.e., the strength of the key, corresponding to
its length in a bit-string representation), and tn − t the duration of the attack on the considered key (i.e., the time
during which the corresponding ciphertext has been known to the adversary, and during which the adversary has
potentially been attacking – i.e., performing computations on – the ciphertext in order to recover the desired key);
and
expired(k) := ∃tn(tn@Eve ∧ ∃te(k validUntil te ∧ te < tn))
k validUntil te := ∃tb(k validBetween (tb,te))
k validBetween (tb,te) := ∃a∃o(a k.o.(tb,te))
tv validityOf k := k validBetween (tb,te) ∧ te − tb = tv
(4) reﬁnement (i.e., onenewconjunct) of the stateof violationwithkey expiration in the truth conditionof thepermission
modality (cf. Table 4):
 := ∃(k : CK)
(
Eve k k ∧ ¬ k ck Eve ∧ ¬expired(k)
)
S. Kramer / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 77 (2008) 60–91 81
Table 11
Deﬁnability of durations
 duration(t,t′) φ := − t( durationt′ φ) ∨ t( durationt′ φ)
 durationt′ φ := (φ → ∀td(td@Eve →
©+ ((φ → ∀tm((tm@Eve ∧ tm ≤ t′) →
 − (tm − td) durationt′ φ)) ∧
(¬φ → ©+ ( durationt′ φ))))) ∧
(¬φ → ©+ ( durationt′ φ))
4.3. Expressiveness
We demonstrate the expressiveness of tCPL on the macro-deﬁnability of important modalities from general-purpose
timed logics:
• point-parametrised future-time (similarly for past-time) modalities (so-called freeze quantiﬁers):
t(φ) := (t@Eve → φ) t(φ) := ¬t(¬φ)
• interval-parametrised future-time (similarly for past-time) modalities with an:
· absolute-time understanding of closed (similarly for open) intervals [t1,t2]:
[t1,t2](φ) := ∀t(t1 ≤ t ≤ t2 →t(φ))
[t1,t2](φ) := ¬[t1,t2](¬φ)
· understanding of intervals that is relative to the current time t@Eve:
[](φ) := ∀t(t@Eve →[t,t+](φ))
[](φ) := ∀t(t@Eve → [t,t+](φ))
• the chop connective:
φ [t,t′] φ′ := ∃t′′([t,t′′](φ) ∧[t′′ ,t′](φ′))
• durations [96,95] (cf. Table 11)
The cryptographic states of affairs involving qualitative temporal modalities from Section 3 can easily be quantitatively
adapted by replacing the qualitative temporal modalities by the above quantitative ones with actual time values (points
and/or intervals) as desired.
4.4. Application: a timed attack scenario
Weexemplify our concept of attack scenario in the timed settingwith another popular attack on a cryptographic protocol,
namely theman-in-the-middle attack on theWide-Mouthed-Frog protocol (WMF) (cf. Table 12).WMF is a server-based, (ses-
sion) key-transport protocol employing symmetric cryptography intended to guarantee timely, unacknowledged transport
of a session key between an initiator and a respondermediating a trusted third party (the server). Timeliness of key transport
means that the responder only accepts session keys within a ﬁxed interval of time. The protocol presumes that the long-
term symmetric keys (e.g., kAliceTrent and kBobTrent) between the initiator (Alice) and the server (Trent) and between the
responder (Bob) and the server have already been generated by the server and established with all other corresponding
clients.
The intention of each protocol step is as follows: the intention of the ﬁrst step is to announce the initiator to the
server; the intention of the second step is twofold, i.e., to transport the session key (e.g., kAliceBob) from the initiator to
the server and to solicit the server to transport the session key to the responder; the intention of the third step is twofold,
i.e., to transport the session key from the server to the responder and to transmit from the server to the responder the
intention of the initiator to communicate securely with the responder by means of the transported session key. The time
stamps are from the initiator’s and the server’s local clock, respectively. Their purpose is to ensure freshness of the session
key.
The protocol narration can be transcribed into a formal language, for example into the one of [21,69], a timed extension of
the one of [24,69], by instantiating the protocol template displayed in Table 13 via substitution of Alice for init, Trent for serv,
and Bob for resp; and choice of a positive time value for v, i.e., half the desired duration of validity of the transported key.
Features of that language are: a double-purpose primitive for lookup of stored keys and (local) time, an input primitive with
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Table 12
Protocol narration for WMF
1a. Alice → Trent : Alice
1b. Alice → Trent : {∣∣((tAlice,Bob),kAliceBob)∣∣}kAliceTrent
2. Trent → Bob : {∣∣((tTrent,Alice),kAliceBob)∣∣}kBobTrent
Table 13
Protocol template for WMF
WMFINIT(slf ,srv,oth,v) := WMFSERV(slf ,v) := WMFRESP(slf ,srv,v) :=
Getslf (ts : CV,) in
New (kso : K,((slf ,oth),(ts,ts + v + v))).
Getsrv (kss : K,(slf ,srv)) in
Outsrv slf . In fst when fst : A.
Getslf (ksf : K,(slf ,fst)) in
Outsrv
{∣∣((ts,oth),kso)∣∣}kss .1 In {∣∣((t,snd),key)∣∣}ksf when t : TV ∧∃ts(ts : TV ∧ ts@slf ∧ t + v ≤ ts) ∧
snd : A ∧
key : K.
Getslf (kss : K,(slf ,snd)) in Getsrv (kss : K,(slf ,srv)) in
Outsnd
{∣∣((ts,fst),key)∣∣}kss .1 In {∣∣((t,oth),key)∣∣}kss when t : TV ∧∃ts(ts : TV ∧ ts@slf ∧ t + v ≤ ts) ∧
oth : A ∧
key : K.1
WMF(init,srv,resp,xinit ,xserv ,xresp,v) := init.xinit [WMFINIT(init,srv,resp,v)] |||
srv.xsrv [WMFSERV(srv,v)] |||
resp.xresp [WMFRESP(resp,srv,v)]
pattern-matching and guard, and primitives for out-of-band communication. The left (right) column of the table deﬁnes the
initiator (responder) role, and the middle column the server role. The bottom row deﬁnes the protocol template, distribut-
ing (via parallel composition) the roles at the corresponding locations init.xinit [·], srv.xsrv [·], and resp.xresp [·], respectively.
Observe that lookup of local time is done in two different ways, namely imperatively by means of the get-instruction (with
 serving as a dummy owner), and declaratively by means of the @-predicate.
The previously mentioned assumption about preliminary symmetric key generation and establishment can be modelled
bymeans of corresponding key-generation and out-of-band communication events, chained up to form the protocol prehis-
tory displayed in Table 14. Observe that the prehistory includes set events for the resetting of all local clocks (with serving
as a dummy session identiﬁer for Eve’s set event).
This completes the deﬁnition of the initial state
(h,WMF(Alice,Trent,Bob,xa1,xt1,xb1,v))
of (our attack scenario for) WMF.
Table 15 displays the narration of the actual attack. The attack can be orchestrated by an active outsider adversary that
performs interception, impersonation, and reﬂection (i.e., replay to the same agent) across three different, interleaved sessions.
However, the attack does not exploit drifting of local clocks (i.e., all drift rates are 1). It consists in:
(1) Eve impersonating Bob in the face of Trent by reﬂecting back to Trent a previously intercepted service reply{∣∣((tTrent,Alice),kAliceBob)∣∣}kBobTrent – perceived as a service request from Bob by (forgetful) Trent – from Trent to Bob to
a service request from Alice
(2) Eve intercepting Trent’s service reply
{∣∣((t′Trent,Bob),kAliceBob)∣∣}kAliceTrent
destined to Alice
(3) Eve impersonating Alice in the face of Trent by reﬂecting back to Trent Trent’s service reply destined to Alice –
perceived as a service request from Alice by (forgetful) Trent – and Trent marshalling the corresponding service reply{∣∣((t′′Trent,Alice),kAliceBob)∣∣}kBobTrent to Bob.
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Table 14
Prehistory for WMF
h :=  · N(Trent,xt0,kAliceTrent,((Trent,Alice),(−∞,∞)))·
N(Trent,xt0,kBobTrent,((Trent,Bob),(−∞,∞)))·
sO(Trent,xt0,kAliceTrent,Alice) · sI(Alice,xa0,kAliceTrent,Trent)·
sO(Trent,xt0,kBobTrent,Bob) · sI(Bob,xb0,kBobTrent,Trent)·
S(Eve,,0) · S(Alice,xa0,0) · S(Bob,xb0,0) · S(Trent,xt0,0)
Table 15
Attack narration for WMF
1a′. EveBob → Trent : Bob
1b′. EveBob → Trent :
{∣∣((tTrent,Alice),kAliceBob)∣∣}kBobTrent
2′. Trent → EveAlice :
{∣∣((t′Trent,Bob),kAliceBob)∣∣}kAliceTrent
1a′′. EveAlice → Trent : Alice
1b′′. EveAlice → Trent :
{∣∣((t′Trent,Bob),kAliceBob)∣∣}kAliceTrent
2′′. Trent → Bob : {∣∣((t′′Trent,Alice),kAliceBob)∣∣}kBobTrent
In result, Bob accepts a session key that possibly is stale due to Eve achieving ﬁrst delay of key delivery through repeated
reﬂection of service replies from Trent back to Trent, and second prolongation of key validity through Trent, who, on each
reﬂection, trustingly restamps the key with a new time stamp (cf. t′Trent and t′′Trent) of his, each time more advanced, local
clock. The session key necessarily is stale when Eve delays each reﬂection by v time units. In sum, the protocol fails to
achieve its requirement of timely, unacknowledged key transport between initiating Alice, mediating Trent, and responding
Bob.
More formally, let
tuaKT(a,b) := ∀(k : K)((Kb(a authored k) → Kb(k sharedSecret (a,b))) →
− [](a authored k))
Q := Trent.xt2 [WMFSERV(Trent,v)] |||
Trent.xt3 [WMFSERV(Trent,v)]
Then:
• (h,Q ) ∈ H× P and
• (h,Q ) |= tuaKTv (Eve,Trent) ⊗ tuaKTv (Eve,Trent) and
• (h ◦ h,WMF(Alice,Trent,Bob,xa1,xt1,xb1,v)|||Q ) |=
¬tuaKTv+v (Alice,Bob)
by which we obtain
(h,WMF(Alice,Trent,Bob,xa1,xt1,xb1,v)) |=
(tuaKTv (Eve,Trent) ⊗ tuaKTv (Eve,Trent))
¬tuaKTv+v (Alice,Bob)
representing our (property-based or logical) attack scenario for WMF. We invite the reader to compare this scenario to the
corresponding, model-based (or process-algebraic) attack scenario described in [21,69].
5. Conclusion
5.1. Review of achievements
We believe having achieved with CPL an original construction and powerful tool for the logical conceptualisation of the
security of communication. In particular, we have:
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(1) deﬁned a cryptographically meaningful (cf. Section 2.3.4) and indeed omnipresent epistemic modality (for proposi-
tional knowledge) that commutes in both senses with quantiﬁers being relativised (this is a novel idea) to individual
knowledge (cf. Corollary 1).
(2) invented a cryptographically interesting (cf. Section 2.3.2) epistemic conditional thanks to the auxiliary invention of
complex truth values.
(3) pioneered the application of spatial logic (cf. Section 2.3.2) to the formalisation of cryptographic states of affairs and
auxiliary concepts such as choice, compositionality, and corruption (cf. Section 3.5, [69]).
(4) invented, by macro-deﬁnition, spatial freeze quantiﬁers, and shown that with them distributed temporal logic is
deﬁnable within the spatio-temporal fragment of CPL (cf. Section 2.3.5).
(5) demonstrated the macro-deﬁnability of a Gödel-style provability modality within the spatio-epistemic fragment of
CPL (cf. Theorem 2). With this modality, CPL can capture the provability meaning of intuitionistic implication, and
provability is shown to be the key to the formalisation of commitment and related cryptographic states of affairs (cf.
Section 3.4)
(6) demonstrated the deﬁnability of cryptographically meaningful (cf. Section 2.3.3) deontic modalities within the
spatio-epistemico-temporal fragment of CPL, and by that, shown that cryptographic permission (and prohibition)
is parametrically reducible to the desired notion of (undesired) state of violation of the employed crypto
system.
(7) demonstrated that the addition of dense real-time to an untimed, property-based formalism for cryptographic protocols
(core CPL) can be simple and backwards-compatible, when properly conceived, but is still powerful enough for the
macro-deﬁnition of durations (cf. Section 4).
(8) conceivedanovelmodal encoding ofweak second-order logic via individual-generating individuals (message-generating
protocols) (cf. Section 2.3.1).
The key to our backwards-compatible extension is the paradigm of event-based modelling. That is, the conservative
extension of protocol histories with new protocol events, e.g., clock-set events for the extension with real time (and
denotation events for the extension with probabilistic polynomial-time [69, Chapter 5]). In consequence, old
languages can be interpreted over new models because new modelling events are irrelevant to that (oblivious)
interpretation.
Thanks to the powerful linguistic abstractions that CPL provides, we have also achieved the logical formalisation of an
unprecedented variety of cryptographic states of affairs. Concretely, these formalised states of affairs are:
Trust-related affairs maliciousness, honesty, faultiness, prudency, and trustworthiness of protocol agents
(cf. Section 3.1).
Conﬁdentiality-related affairs shared secret, secrecy, anonymity, data derivation, non-interaction, perfect forward secrecy,
known-key attack, and agent corruption (cf. Section 3.2).
Authentication-related affairs key conﬁrmation, key authentication (implicit and explicit), message integrity, message
authorship, message authentication (authenticity), key transport (unacknowledged and acknowledged), key agreement
(unacknowledged and acknowledged), entity authentication (identiﬁcation) (unilateral, weakly mutual, and strongly
mutual) (cf. Section 3.3).
Commitment-related affairs cryptographic proof, cryptographic evidence, provability, non-repudiation, contract signing,
(optimism, completion, accountability, and abuse-freeness) (cf. Section 3.4).
Compositionality-related affairs key separation, compositional correctness (existential composability, conditional com-
posability, and universal composability), and attack scenario (cf. Section 3.5).
We hope that our tentative formalisations have convinced the reader that CPL is an interesting candidate as a lingua franca
for requirements-engineering cryptographic protocols.
5.2. Future work
Short-term Our immediate concerns are the consolidation of ppCPL, and the validation of our formalisations of fundamental
and applied concepts w.r.t. their traditional Turing-machine-based deﬁnitions.
Mid-term Our next concerns are the construction of proof systems for core CPL, tCPL, and ppCPL; and the study of decidable
fragments of core CPL and its extensions.
Long-term Our long-term concerns are the construction of a Curry-Howard isomorphism between cryptographic protocols
and propositions; and the extension of CPL with quantum cryptography.
Finally, we are concerned with the conception of an integrated engineering methodology for our formalisms, and the
development of tool support, and application to more case studies.
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Appendix
A. Speciﬁcation library
Classical propositional and ﬁrst-order operators
 := Eve : Adv true
⊥ := ¬ false
φ ∨ φ′ := ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬φ′) φ or φ′
φ → φ′ := ¬φ ∨ φ′ if φ then φ′
φ ↔ φ′ := (φ → φ′) ∧ (φ′ → φ) φ if and only if φ′
∃v(φ) := ¬∀v(¬φ) there is v s.t. φ
∀(v : θ)(φ) := ∀v(v : θ → φ)
∃(v : θ)(φ) := ∃v(v : θ ∧ φ)
Modal operators
Fφ := ¬Pφ it is forbidden that φ
φ ≡ φ′ := (φ ⊇ φ′) ∧ (φ′ ⊇ φ) φ is epistemically equivalent to φ′
φ ⊕ φ′ := ¬(¬φ ⊗ ¬φ′) φ disjunctively separates φ′
φ := φ ⊕ ⊥ everywhere φ
φ := ¬¬φ somewhere φ
φ′  φ := ¬(φ′  ¬φ) assert φ′ guarantee φ
φ	 φ′ := ¬φ ⊕ φ′ φ linearly implies φ′
* := ©−⊥ in the beginning
† := ©+⊥ in the end

φ := φ S ⊥ so far φ
−φ := ¬
¬φ once φ
1.φ := φ ∧ ¬©− −φ for the ﬁrst time φ
φ := φ U ⊥ henceforth φ
φ := ¬¬φ eventually φ
φ ≤ φ′ := (φ ∧ φ′) ∨ (φ′ ∧ −φ) φ before φ′
φ φ′ := (φ ↔ φ′) ∧ (φ′ ↔ −φ) φ correlates φ′
Relational symbols
F = F ′ := F F ′ ∧ F ′ F F is equal to F ′
F ≺ F ′ := F = F ′ ∧ ¬ F F ′ F is a strict subterm of F ′
a h F := ∃v(F v ∧ a k v) a has/possesses F
a tk F := a h F ∧ ¬ a k F a tacitly knows F
F : ∅ := ⊥
F : H[θ ] := ∃(v : θ)(F = "v#)
F : SCF ′ [θ ] := ∃(v : θ)(F =
{∣∣v∣∣}
F ′ )
F : ACp+ [θ ] := ∃(v : θ)(F =
{∣∣v∣∣}+
p+ )
F : Sp[θ ] := ∃(v : θ)(F =
{∣∣v∣∣}−
p
)
F : T[θ ,θ ′] := ∃(v : θ)∃(v′ : θ ′)(F = (v,v′))
F : θ ∪ θ ′ := F : θ ∨ F : θ ′
F : θ ∩ θ ′ := F : θ ∧ F : θ ′
F : θ \ θ ′ := F : θ ∧ ¬ F : θ ′
F : M := 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F : SC[θ ] := ∃v(F : SCv[θ ])
F : AC[θ ] := ∃(v : K+)(F : ACv[θ ])
F : C[θ ] := F : SC[θ ] ∪ AC[θ ]
F : S[θ ] := ∃(v : K−)(F : Sv[θ ])
θ $ θ ′ := ∀(v : θ)(v : θ ′) θ is a subtype of θ ′
θ = θ ′ := θ $ θ ′ ∧ θ ′ $ θ
θ θ ′ := θ $ θ ′ ∧ θ ′ /= θ
F F ′ := ∃v({∣∣v∣∣}
F
 F ′)
p+ + F := ∃v({∣∣v∣∣}+
p+  F)
p− F := ∃v({∣∣v∣∣}−
p
 F)
F*F ′ := F F ′ ∨ F+ F ′ ∨ F− F ′ F is operational in F ′
F F ′ := ∃v∃v′(F v ∧ {∣∣v∣∣}
v′  F ′)
F+ F ′ := ∃v∃(p+ : K+)(F v ∧ {∣∣v∣∣}+
p+  F ′)
F− F ′ := ∃v∃(p : K−)(F v ∧ {∣∣v∣∣}−
p
 F ′)
F*F ′ := F F ′ ∨ F+ F ′ ∨ F− F ′ F is guarded in F ′
k sk a := ∃b∃o(b k.o ∧ a o) k is a symmetric key for a
k sk1 a := k sk a ∧ k : K1 k is a session/short-term key for a
k sk∞ a := k sk a ∧ k : K∞ k is a long-term key for a
p prk a := ∃b∃o(bp.o ∧ a o) p is a private key for a
n puk a := ∃v(v+ = n ∧ v prk a) n is a public key for a
n ck a := n sk a ∨ n prk a n is a conﬁdential key for a
B. Proofs
B.0.0.1. Proof of Theorem 1
• Barcan: Suppose that s ∈ H× P and s |= ∀m(Ka(φ)). Then, for all M ∈ M, s |= Ka(φ). Hence, for all M ∈ M, s |= φ (by
|= Ka(φ) → φ), and thus s |= ∀m(φ). Conclude that s |= Ka(∀m(φ)) by the hypothesis that s |= Ka(φ) and the fact that
keys(∀m(φ)) ⊂ keys(φ) (fulﬁlling the truth condition for propositional knowledge).
• Relativised co-Barcan: Suppose that s ∈ H× P and s |= Ka(∀m(a k m → φ)). Further, suppose that M ∈ M and s |=
a k M. Hence, s |= Ka(a k M) and s |= Ka(a k M → φ). Consequently, s |= Ka(φ) (by |= Ka(ϕ → ϕ′) → (Ka(ϕ) → Ka(ϕ′))).
Conclude that s |= a k M → Ka(φ) by the hypothesis s |= a k M, and ﬁnally that s |= ∀m(a k m → Ka(φ)).
B.0.0.2. Proof of Proposition 2 by counterexample (logical equivalence is incompatible with Ka):
• Eve : Adv ⇔ k : K because |= Eve : Adv and |= k : K, but
• Ka(Eve : Adv) ⇔ Ka(k : K) because the establishment of the truth of Ka(Eve : Adv) does not dependent on a’s knowledge
of the key values in Eve : Adv (there aren’t any), whereas the establishment of the truth of Ka(k : K) does dependent on
a’s knowledge of the key values in k : K (there is one).
Hence, |= Ka(Eve : Adv), i.e., Ka(Eve : Adv) is a logical truth (tautology), but |= Ka(k : K), i.e., Ka(k : K) is only a contingent truth.
Yet, a logical truth is, by deﬁnition, not logically equivalent to a contingent truth.
Lemma 1. φ ⇒ φ′ iff |= φ → φ′.
Proof
|= φ → φ′ iff
for all s, s |= φ → φ′ iff
for all s, s |= ¬φ ∨ φ′ iff
for all s, s |= ¬(¬¬φ ∧ ¬φ′) iff
for all s, not s |= ¬¬φ ∧ ¬φ′ iff
for all s, not (s |= ¬¬φ and s |= ¬φ′) iff
for all s, not (not not s |= φ and not s |= φ′) iff
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for all s, not (s |= φ and not s |= φ′) iff
for all s, not s |= φ or not not s |= φ′ iff
for all s, not s |= φ or s |= φ′ iff
for all s, if s |= φ then s |= φ′ iff
φ ⇒ φ′. 
Proposition 3. |= Pa(φ → φ′) → (Pa(φ) → Pa(φ′)).
Proof
1. s |= Pa(φ → φ′) hyp.
2. s |= Pa(φ) hyp.
3. s |= ∃m(m proofFor (φ → φ′) ∧ a k m) 1
4. there isM ∈ M s.t. s |= M proofFor (φ → φ′) ∧ a k M 3
5. M ∈ M and s |= M proofFor (φ → φ′) ∧ a k M hyp.
6. s |= ∃m(m proofFor (φ) ∧ a k m) 2
7. there isM ∈ M s.t. s |= M proofFor (φ) ∧ a k M 6
8. M′ ∈ M and s |= M′ proofFor (φ) ∧ a k M′ hyp.
9. s |= M proofFor (φ → φ′) and s |= a k M 5
10. s |= ∀(v : AAdv)(v k MKv(φ → φ′)) 9
11. for all v ∈ AEve, s |= v k MKv(φ → φ′) 10
12. s |= M′ proofFor (φ) and s |= a k M′ 8
13. s |= ∀(v : AAdv)(v k M′Kv(φ)) 12
14. for all v ∈ AEve, s |= v k M′Kv(φ) 13
15. v ∈ AEve hyp.
16. s′ |= v k (M,M′) hyp.
17. s′ |= v k M 16, property of k
18. s |= v k MKv(φ → φ′) 11, 15
19. for all s′, if s′ |= v k M then s′ ◦ s |= Kv(φ → φ′) 18
20. if s′ |= v k M then s′ ◦ s |= Kv(φ → φ′) 19
21. s′ ◦ s |= Kv(φ → φ′) 17, 20
22. s′ |= v k M′ 16, property of k
23. s |= v k M′Kv(φ) 14, 15
24. for all s′, if s′ |= v k M′ then s′ ◦ s |= Kv(φ) 23
25. if s′ |= v k M′ then s′ ◦ s |= Kv(φ) 24
26. s′ ◦ s |= Kv(φ) 22, 25
27. s′ ◦ s |= Kv(φ′) 21, 26, property of K
28. if s′ |= v k (M,M′) then s′ ◦ s |= Kv(φ′) 16, 27
29. for all s′, if s′ |= v k (M,M′) then s′ ◦ s |= Kv(φ′) 28
30. s |= v k (M,M′)Kv(φ′) 29
31. if v ∈ AEve then s |= v k (M,M′)Kv(φ′) 15, 30
32. for all v ∈ AEve, s |= v k (M,M′)Kv(φ′) 31
33. s |= ∀(v : AAdv)(v k (M,M′)Kv(φ′)) 32
34. s |= (M,M′) proofFor φ′ 33
35. s |= a k (M,M′) 9, 12, property of k
36. s |= (M,M′) proofFor φ′ and s |= a k (M,M′) 34, 35
37. s |= (M,M′) proofFor φ′ ∧ a k (M,M′) 36
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38. there isM′′ ∈ M s.t. s |= M′′ proofFor φ′ ∧ a k M′′ 37
39. s |= ∃m(m proofFor φ′ ∧ a k m) 38
40. s |= Pa(φ′) 39
41. s |= Pa(φ′) 7, 40
42. s |= Pa(φ′) 4, 41
43. if s |= Pa(φ) then s |= Pa(φ′) 2, 42
44. s |= Pa(φ) → Pa(φ′) 43
45. if s |= Pa(φ → φ′) then s |= Pa(φ) → Pa(φ′) 1, 44
46. for all s, if s |= Pa(φ → φ′) then s |= Pa(φ) → Pa(φ′) 45
47. Pa(φ → φ′) ⇒ Pa(φ) → Pa(φ′) 46, Deﬁnition 8
48. |= Pa(φ → φ′) → (Pa(φ) → Pa(φ′)) 47, Lemma 1 
Proposition 4. |= Pa(φ) → Ka(φ).
Proof
1. s |= Pa(φ) hyp.
2. s |= ∃m(m proofFor φ ∧ a k m) 1
3. there isM ∈ M s.t. s |= M proofFor φ ∧ a k M 2
4. M ∈ M and s |= M proofFor φ ∧ a k M hyp.
5. s |= M proofFor φ and s |= a k M 4
6. s |= ∀(v : AAdv)(v k M  Kv(φ)) 5
7. for all v ∈ AEve, s |= v k M  Kv(φ) 6
8. s |= a k M  Ka(φ) 7
9. for all s′, if s′ |= a k M then s′ ◦ s |= Ka(φ) 8
10. if s |= a k M then s ◦ s |= Ka(φ) 9
11. s ◦ s |= Ka(φ) 5, 10
12. s |= Ka(φ) 1131
13. s |= Ka(φ) 3, 12
14. if s |= Pa(φ) then s |= Ka(φ) 1, 13
15. for all s, if s |= Pa(φ) then s |= Ka(φ) 14
16. Pa(φ) ⇒ Ka(φ) 15, Deﬁnition 8
17. |= Pa(φ) → Ka(φ) 16, Lemma 1 
Proposition 5. |= Pa(φ) → φ.
Proof
1. |= Pa(φ) → Ka(φ) Proposition 4
2. |= Ka(φ) → φ property of K
3. |= Pa(φ) → φ 1, 2 
Proposition 6. |= Pa(φ) → Pa(Pa(φ)).
Proof
1. s |= Pa(φ) hyp.
2. s |= ∃m(m proofFor φ ∧ a k m) 1
3. there isM ∈ M s.t. s |= M proofFor φ ∧ a k M 2
31 ◦ is supposed to preserve uniqueness of process terms and of protocol events in protocol histories, i.e., ◦ is supposed to be idempotent.
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4. M ∈ M and s |= M proofFor φ and s |= a k M 3
5. v ∈ AEve hyp.
6. s′ |= v k M hyp.
7. s′ ◦ s |= v k M 6
8. s′ ◦ s |= Kv(a k M) 4, 7, deﬁnition of K
9. s′ ◦ s |= Kv(M proofFor φ) 4, 7
10. s′ ◦ s |= Kv(Pa(φ)) 8, 9
11. if s′ |= v k M then s′ ◦ s |= Kv(Pa(φ)) 6, 10
12. for all s′, if s′ |= v k M then s′ ◦ s |= Kv(Pa(φ)) 11
13. s |= v k M  Kv(Pa(φ)) 12
14. if v ∈ AEve then s |= v k M  Kv(Pa(φ)) 5, 13
15. for all v ∈ AEve, s |= v k M  Kv(Pa(φ)) 14
16. s |= ∀(v : AAdv)(v k M  Kv(Pa(φ))) 15
17. s |= M proofFor Pa(φ) and s |= a k M 4, 16
18. there isM ∈ M s.t. s |= M proofFor Pa(φ) ∧ a k M 17
19. s |= ∃m(m proofFor Pa(φ) ∧ a k m) 18
20. s |= Pa(Pa(φ)) 19
21. s |= Pa(Pa(φ)) 3, 20
22. if s |= Pa(φ) then s |= Pa(Pa(φ)) 1, 21
23. for all s, if s |= Pa(φ) then s |= Pa(Pa(φ)) 22
24. Pa(φ) ⇒ Pa(Pa(φ)) 23, Deﬁnition 8
25. |= Pa(φ) → Pa(Pa(φ)) 24, Lemma 1 
Proposition 7.
|= φ
|= a k M → Pa(φ) M is a tuple of the key values in φ.
Proof
1. |= φ andM is a tuple of the key values in φ hyp.
2. s |= a k M hyp.
3. v ∈ AEve hyp.
4. s′ |= v k M hyp.
5. s′ ◦ s |= v k M 4
6. s′ ◦ s |= Kv(φ) 1, 5, epistemic necessitation
7. if s′ |= v k M then s′ ◦ s |= Kv(φ) 4, 6
8. for all s′, if s′ |= v k M then s′ ◦ s |= Kv(φ) 7
9. s |= v k M  Kv(φ) 8
10. if v ∈ AEve then s |= v k M  Kv(φ) 3, 9
11. for all v ∈ AEve, s |= v k M  Kv(φ) 10
12. s |= ∀(v : AAdv)(v k M  Kv(φ)) 11
13. s |= M proofFor φ and s |= a k M 2, 12
14. there isM ∈ M s.t. s |= M proofFor φ ∧ a k M 13
15. s |= ∃m(m proofFor φ ∧ a k m) 14
16. s |= Pa(φ) 15
17. if s |= a k M then s |= Pa(φ) 2, 16
18. for all s, if s |= a k M then s |= Pa(φ) 17
19. a k M ⇒ Pa(φ) 18, Deﬁnition 8
20. |= a k M → Pa(φ) 19, Lemma 1 
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